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ABSTRACT 
This thesis studies the emergence of Shared Situation Understanding within the context of 
National Cyber Security among a network of actors. Cyber Security is a key enabler of 
continuity and resilience for functioning of ICT infrastructure, upon which many societal 
functions are built. In the modern globally networked world, national cyber security is under 
threat from national actors, criminals, misuse and other issues.  
 
Situation Awareness is today accepted as a key part of any cyber security operation, but 
how does Shared Situation Awareness emerge within the national cyber security context? 
This thesis looks at the Situation Awareness of different actors, how they produce Situation 
Understanding and how this information is then shared within the network. Main question 
for this thesis is: how does Shared Situation Understanding emerge from these networks? 
Empirical research was conducted via interviews of national cyber security actors, three of 
which represented the governmental actors and three the private sector. Their cyber security 
frameworks, Situation Awareness-function and Situation Understanding-processes were as-
sessed.  
 
The national cyber security networks have some information sharing operations functional, 
but there is limited information exchange. Sharing of SA-level information is somewhat 
effective, but there is limited sharing of SU-level information Especially between the pri-
vate organizations information sharing is limited, most successful sharing is done via a cen-
tral governmental node. There should be more emphasis on information sharing framework 
definition, ways of working and understanding of private organization incentives to join 
and work within such networks. 
KEY WORDS: 
Cyber, cyber space, cyber threat, cyber security, national cyber security, situation aware-
ness, situation understanding, shared situation awareness 
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
Tämä Pro Gradu -tutkimus käsittelee jaettua tilanneymmärrystä kansallisen kyberturvallisuu-
den verkostoissa. Nykypäivän verkottuneessa ja globaalissa maailmassa kyberturvallisuus on 
yksi toimintavarmuuden tae. Uhkia ja haavoittuvuuksia vastaan suojaudutaan kansallisesti 
verkostossa, jossa on sekä kansallisia että yksityisiä toimijoita verkostoissa. 
 
Tilannekuvaa pidetään nykyään yleisesti yhtenä avaintekijänä tehokkaan kyberturvallisuus-
toiminnan luomisessa, mutta miten tilannekuvatietoa jaetaan kansallisen kyberturvallisuuden 
verkostoissa? Tämä tutkielma pyrki tutkimaan tapoja, joilla toimijat ensin tuottavat omasta 
tilannekuvastaan tilanneymmärrystä ja jakavat näitä tietoja kansallisissa verkostoissa, kan-
sallisen jaetun tilanneymmärryksen tuottamiseksi. Tutkimus toteutettiin kuuden kansallisen 
kyberturvallisuuden verkoston toimijan haastatteluina, joista kolme oli kansallisia toimijoita 
ja kolme yksityistä organisaatiota. Haastatteluissa käsiteltiin heidän kyberturvallisuuden toi-
mintakehikkoa, tilannekuvaa, -ymmärrystä sekä toimintaa verkostoissa näiden tietojen jaka-
miseksi. 
 
Kansallisissa verkostoissa jaetaan jonkin verran tietoa, mutta varsinainen tiedonvaihto jää 
vähäiseksi. Tilannekuvaan liittyvää tietoa jaetaan, mutta tilanneymmärrykseen liittyvää tie-
toa hyvin paljon vähemmän. Erityisesti yksityiset yritykset eivät juuri jaa keskenään tietoa, 
vaan jakaminen tapahtuu verkoston keskiössä olevan kansallisen toimijan kautta. Huomiota 
tulisikin kiinnittää tiedonjaon toimintakehikon määrittelemiseksi, toimintamallien luo-
miseksi sekä yksityisten yritysten kannustimien ymmärtämiseksi toimivan tiedonvaihdon ai-
kaansaamisessa. 
 
AVAINSANAT 
Kyber, kyberavaruus, kyberuhka, kyberturvallisuus, kansallinen kyberturvallisuus, tilanne-
kuva, tilanneymmärrys, jaettu tilanneymmärrys 
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NATIONAL CYBER SECURITY – SITUATION UNDERSTANDING WITHIN A NET-
WORK OF ACTORS 
 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Three major dimensions have been added to the definition of warfare and the battlefield over 
the last few decades: (1) space, (2) electromagnetic spectrum and (3) minds (in terms of infor-
mation and psychological warfare). The integration of battlefield systems into a single, over-
arching master-system, has inducted the battlefield troops as part of the cyber space as well. 
This kind of system of systems is a prime target for an attacker possessing cyber-attack capa-
bilities and provides a single point of failure for all connected systems. Thus, understanding 
cyber and being able to protect systems connected to it is essential, not only for the battlefield 
troops, but specifically the command and control functions. (Sirén, 2011, Kosola & Solante 
2013.) 
 
Beyond the battlefield, these developments pose challenges to the protection of civil society. 
As we are witnessing a brave new world built on communication networks and computers, the 
cyber space is increasingly plagued by DDoS-attacks, ransomware, malware, cyber espionage 
and data breaches. Monitoring and protecting the cyber security is becoming a crucial part of 
national security, especially in terms of the value of continuity and preparedness for upkeeping 
the functions of society. A society that cannot protect its cyber infrastructure, is vulnerable to a 
number of cyber-attacks; ranging from the activist hackers wreaking havoc just for show to 
nation states trying to undermine the democratic stability of a neighbour. At the same time a 
realization is emerging that technical solutions by themselves cannot offer complete protection, 
but rather the answer to the cyber conundrum lies in cooperation, communication and a func-
tioning network of public and private actors (Lehto, Limnéll, Kokkomäki, Pöyhönen & 
Salminen, 2018, 14-15).  
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Compared to the times before far reaching information technology emerging in the society, 
national security was almost fully directed and ensured by the state. The army, stockpiles and 
reserves are just a few of the mechanisms that nation states used to manage the national security. 
While the need for cooperation grew as nations moved toward modernity, the current digital 
infrastructure is previously unseen in its complexity. In Finland, the aim of the Cyber Security 
Strategy is the ability to protect the essential functions of society from cyber-attacks in all cir-
cumstances. The tools to manage this are speed, transparency and co-ordination between actors. 
At the same time, the strategy acknowledges the fact that cyber security is a networked function, 
consisting of governmental, private and NGO-actors, who all must be committed to common 
goals and follow mutually agreed ways of working. (Finnish Government, 2013.) 
 
1.1 Background 
 
“The complexity, effectiveness, and capability of cyber-attacks is growing faster than the 
defensive capabilities.”  
Lehto & Limnéll (2017, 180) 
 
To get the deteriorating situation under control, national and private actors need to be able to 
understand their current status, to identify weaknesses within the systems and understand 
threats to their own operations. On a national level, a common understanding must be created, 
to provide a baseline for development, information sharing and directing actions. Only when 
you understand your current plight, can you truly focus efforts to correct them. Whether it be 
on a national or organizational level, situation awareness is key to long term improvement in 
cyber security.  
 
The first problem that arises is the unclear definition of cyber security, especially on the national 
level. As national security has evolved, less of the infrastructure and functions that require safe-
guarding are in the hands of national governments. Rather, private infrastructure has expanded 
and even personal devices need to be included within the scope of modern national cyber secu-
rity. How can a government secure infrastructure, devices and functions that are not in its direct 
control? One recent trend, seen in cyber security, but encompassing other fields as well, is the 
explosion of regulation. But surely, there must be more that can be done? The facilitation of co-
operation and building of trust between competitive areas is something that the government is 
in prime position to manufacture.  
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But the question is how? In Finland, plenty of resolutions and strategies have been produced in 
the field of cyber security relating to the nation state: different security strategies, cyber security 
strategies and implementation programmes. However, results are yet to provide much comfort. 
The research project by Lehto, Limnéll, Innola, Pöyhönen, Rusi and Salmela (2017) paints a 
picture that is less rosy than the usual proclamations of Finland as a global leader in cyber 
security. The project team concludes that there is no shared situation awareness for cyber secu-
rity on a national level, in addition co-operation is rather sporadic and remains siloed both in 
different fields of governmental functions as well as different private sectors. (Lehto et al., 
2017.) 
 
When you state your aim to be a global leader, but end up lacking behind every selected western 
peer, something is awry (Lehto et al., 2017, rank Finland far below the top in their study of 
cyber security capabilities). The challenge for cyber security is the bridging of high-minded 
visions and goal statements with the nitty-gritty of everyday work to ensure security of cyber 
space. Obviously, when it comes to development actions one big enabler is money, but one 
would venture a more efficient use of current capabilities and resources could provide leaps in 
overall ability in cyber security. Especially fostering co-operation and providing safe spaces for 
information exchange, best practices with the governmental seal of approval and assertions of 
confidentiality might have big effects overall.  
 
This thesis takes on these themes head on, first through looking to understand what cyber secu-
rity is and what it means for a nation state. The republic of Finland will act as our frame of 
reference and research case. Finland began the great cyber leap forward in 2014 by unveiling 
the national cyber security strategy and other initiatives. This development has not built the 
expected momentum, however, as the recently published research by Lehto et al. (2017) reveals. 
The grandiose aims of Finland as the front runner of cyber security in the world have been 
dampened by a dose of reality, as investment efficiency and coordination do not seem to be on 
a level that would provide leverage for a small nation to be able to reach beyond its limits. Once 
we have clarity of what one understands by cyber security and what it means within a national 
context, we move on towards situation awareness and understanding. To understand the na-
tional cyber security network, this thesis takes a view of situation awareness and understanding 
and what they mean in the context of national cyber security.   
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1.2 Research aims 
 
This thesis has two major guiding principles: (1) what is cyber and cyber security, (2) situation 
understanding. Looking at these two principles, we aim to provide a look at what cyber security 
is from a national point-of-view and how in that context can you build situation understanding. 
After looking at these two concepts from a theoretical point of view, the theory is then tested 
via themed interviews of national cyber security actors. Finally, we combine the theoretical and 
empirical views to draw conclusions and provide discussion on the topics 
 
The main research question that this thesis aims to answer is: 
- How does situation understanding form in a network of national cyber security actors, 
through shared situation awareness and understanding? 
Supporting research questions are: 
- What is situation understanding composed of within the context of national cyber se-
curity? 
- How does situation understanding arise from situation awareness? 
 
2 METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter will present the study methodology and the two theoretical models, that were used 
as the guiding principles in this thesis. The study will consist of the theory building using an 
abductive content analysis and the empirical research conducted via themed interviews. The 
theory will be built on two distinct parts: (1) the concept analysis of cyber and (2) the current 
research of situation awareness and understanding through a literature analysis. The interview 
themes will be built on the guiding principles and the theoretical understanding built from the 
literature analysis.  
 
The first of the guiding principles presented as the theoretical background is the concept anal-
ysis of cyber security presented as background for the whole study in chapter 3.1, the view of 
cyber and its sub-concepts is based on two different collections of sources: (1) on scientific 
literature and (2) the formal documents of the Finnish Government on the issue. A synthesis on 
the views is presented as a conclusion of the chapter that will guide the study throughout as a 
context.  
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The second guiding principle is our view on situation understanding, that will be provided by 
two main theories on situation awareness and how it can be leveraged in cyber context. The two 
guiding theoretical views are: (1) Endsley’s (e.g. Endsley 1988, 1993, 1995) view on pure sit-
uation awareness and (2) Boyd’s (e.g. Boyd 1986, 1987, 1995) OODA-loop on decision mak-
ing. This view was then tested through as a case study by conducting themed interviews with 
six national cyber security actors. The interviews were analysed through the prism of the theo-
retical view of Situation Awareness (SA) and Situation Understanding (SU). 
 
2.1 Qualitative Case Study 
 
The study used qualitative research methods to build a theoretical view of the concepts of cyber 
security and situation awareness. Qualitative research aims to look at the research problem from 
many angles and to represent real life concepts through theoretical analysis. The aim is to ask 
“why?” relating to the research topic in addition to asking “what?”. Why does the phenomenon 
happen and why is it important? (Hirsjärvi, Remes & Sajavaara, 2015 & Alasuutari 1999.) 
 
The aim of qualitative research is to understand the subject of the research, rather than to map 
direct universal causality between phenomena. The subjects of the study are natural actors and 
the research is conducted in a space, where all functions cannot be controlled. The results pro-
vide understanding behind the phenomena, rather than strict scientific conclusions ready to be 
tested. The case study as a method will provide deep understanding into the phenomena and 
dynamics and factors within a certain phenomenon. The benefits of a case study are its flexi-
bility and consideration of context. A case study aims for a holistic understanding and usually 
will provide new questions to base further inquiry on. (Hirsjärvi et al., 2015, Rantapelkonen & 
Koistinen, 2016.) 
 
In the scope of this thesis is to understand how cyber security and national cyber security are 
defined by research and the Finnish government. The aim of the empirical research was to test 
the theoretical view of cyber security within the network of national cyber security actors. What 
happens in this network of actors, when the aim is to build situation understanding with the aim 
of preserving and improving national cyber security? As the basis of our case study, we built 
an understanding of the concept of national cyber security, then through the interviews a sample 
of this network of national cyber security actors was used as he case study sample. 
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2.2 Abductive Content Analysis 
 
According to Peirce abductive reasoning is based on the value of the guiding principle, while 
his model of logic is itself based on the belief that facts, or practical experience, are always 
logical and experience itself cannot be doubted. Only the presentation of experience on a gen-
eral level can be doubted; the presentation of experience is always logical or un-logical.  Ac-
cording to this line of thinking, logic is independent from deduction, which can be based even 
on vague intuitive assumption, but also from facts themselves and behaviour which are always 
logical. Pierce states that when analysing collected material using abductive method, one 
mustn’t look to “abduct” all phenomena or processes, but rather rely on the inherent ability of 
humans to come to the right conclusions, even intuitively. Intuition cannot, however, function 
as a source of information, rather fundamental categorization is required. (Peirce, 1931-58, 
Peirce, 1958, Feibelman, 1960.)  
 
Abduction as a concept is related to induction and deduction, abduction means to look for a 
meaning from observed phenomena. Abduction itself does not produce new information, but 
acts as a way to track down information. Abduction is proven to be correct, when the phenom-
ena is examined and the conclusion is that the issue is as claimed. The thought process of the 
student ranges from content analysis to existing models, with the student combining these points 
of view, sometimes in very creative ways. When taking an abductive approach, the experience 
based knowledge of the student is brought out through creative, intuitive hypothesis, that is 
examined by the student. Abductive approach looks for alternative points of view and additional 
information acquired through these views. (Grönfors, 2011, Tuomi & Sarajärvi, 2002.) 
 
The theoretical background content was analysed through abductive content analysis, where 
previous theory acts as a guiding principle for the study (Peirce, 1958, 96-97), here our two 
main theoretical views will act as the guiding principles: (1) concept analysis of cyber and (2) 
Situation awareness and understanding research. The aim was to study the theories behind sit-
uation awareness and understanding and based on these theories look to build a view on what 
SA and SU are in the context of national cyber security, based on our other guiding principle 
of cyber security. This view was then tested through themed interviews of actual stakeholders 
of national security to validate the view.  
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The second guiding principle consists of the two main theories on situation awareness and un-
derstanding by Mica R. Endsley’s model of Situation Awareness (e.g. Endsley, 2000) and John 
R. Boyd’s OODA-loop model (e.g. Boyd, 1987). The two models map together as analysed in 
chapter 3.2. and complement each other in ways that are beneficial to the scope of this study. 
The guiding theories are complemented by a look at situation awareness and understanding 
within a network of actors and then by bringing the situation awareness and understanding view 
to the cyber realm, looking at SA within a cyber-context. 
 
Abductive research will always have uncertainty factors built into it, as the analysis is based on 
the intuition and conclusions of the student. We will look to confirm the theoretical views via 
information gathering through themed interviews. The interview structure was based on the 
structure of the theoretical background and this structure was also used in the analysis and cod-
ification of the interview data. This analysis and codification provide reliability and validity to 
the study. (Rantapelkonen & Koistinen, 2016.) 
 
2.3 Theme Interviews 
 
The empirical data was gathered through theme interviews of current national cyber security 
actors and how situation awareness is constructed within this network of actors. The interview 
themes were based on the theoretical understanding of national cyber security and the model of 
cybersecurity situation awareness, with the aim of validation of the view based on theory in the 
real world. Theme interviews are based on loose themes, that stem from theory. These themes 
were covered with the interviewees without strictly restricting the flow of the interviews or 
conversations. As such, themed interviews leave a lot of flexibility to the conversation and can 
provide significant insight into the phenomenon under study. (Hirsjärvi et al., 2015.)  
 
8 
 
A themed interview assumes that the interviewee has experienced the phenomenon that is under 
study, as such he is a prime candidate for the interview. The interviewer must also have a deep 
understanding of the issue at hand, to be able to guide the interview and enable the interviewee 
to articulate his views and provide real insights. The interview is based on pre-selected themes 
that the interviewer has constructed upon his knowledge of the phenomenon. All interviews 
within the study were based on the same themes, but the actual interviews differed in scope, 
order and language used. These differences may provide insight to the student of the phenom-
enon in addition to the actual answers given within the interview. (Rantapelkonen & Koistinen, 
2016.) 
 
3 GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
 
The abductive study of this thesis is guided by two main theoretical concepts: cyber security 
and situation understanding. These theoretical concepts are presented in depth in the following 
chapters. The guiding principles guide the research within the whole of this thesis, having had 
influence in everything related to the research, from the first tentative steps browsing through 
previous research to the theme interviews and discussion that were had with the interviewees. 
Finally, the results of the interviews are broken down according to the guiding principles and 
the research material collected through the interviews is analyzed based on the theoretical con-
cepts of cyber security and situation understanding. 
 
3.1 Cyber 
 
We will begin by asking the question “what is cyber security?”. The answer will be provided 
by two distinct views: (1) a concept analysis of cyber security based on existing research and 
current literature, and (2) cyber security based on formal national security strategy of society, 
cyber security strategy and the implementation programme of the cyber security strategy from 
the Finnish government. Our aim is to understand whether the national point of view encom-
passes all that the current research understands by cyber security, what are the possible gaps 
and how they affect the building of situation awareness of national cyber security.  
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As Limnéll, Majewski and Salminen (2015, 29) state: the separation of the digital and physical 
realms in the world today is nearly impossible and thus the definition of cyber security in an 
exhaustive manner proves challenging. Cyber as a prefix alludes to the digital world, but as the 
digital and physical converge, it is difficult to make a clear distinction between the two. The 
importance of a common view of what is and what is not cyber security. This view is essential 
to provide a platform for cooperation and common functions, especially when the network re-
quires private and public entities to function together. 
 
3.1.1 Cyber Security – Research and Literature 
 
There is no single definition of cyber security or related concept that would be globally accepted 
at this time. Depending on the source, cyber is seen as a prefix defined by what comes after it 
or as a definitive article, defining the concept that comes after. This chapter will gather and 
analyse different definitions of cyber and related concepts, to form an understanding which will 
be used within the scope of this study. 
 
Cyber 
Limnéll et al. (2015, 29-30) state that cyber is rarely seen by itself, but rather used in combina-
tion with a defining concept, more as a prefix or an adjective. For them prefix defines the realm 
as being “of cyber” and the following term determines the action or function. The United King-
dom Ministry of Defence (2016a, 3) defines cyber: “to operate and project power in and from 
cyberspace to influence the behaviour of people or the course of events”.  By this definition 
cyber is seen as the origin term, rather than just a prefix that requires a definitive term to follow. 
For the UK Ministry of Defence, the other terms, such as cyber space, -threat and security 
accrue their meaning form the prefix, for Limnéll et al. (2015), it is the other way around. The 
end result, however, is the same for both methods, as the following concepts and their analysis 
shall show. The term cyber within this study means to relate to the cyber space. 
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Cyber Space 
Most attribute the emergence of the term cyber space to William Gibson’s 1984 classic science-
fiction epic “Neuromancer”, where it was described as “A graphic representation of data ab-
stracted from the banks of every computer in the human system. Unthinkable complexity. Lines 
of light ranged in the non-space of the mind, clusters and constellations of data.” One cannot 
avoid being struck by the prescience of Mr. Gibson’s vision, it seems to describe the current 
infrastructure to a t. Even if the particulars have evolved beyond his vision, the basic image of 
complexity and abstraction rings true. (Gibson, 1984.) 
 
Earlier views of cyber space viewed it as a technical concept, for example the National Security 
Presidential Directive (NSPD) 54 from the Obama White House from 2008 definition is as 
follows: “Cyberspace means the interdependence network of IT infrastructures, and includes 
the Internet, telecoms networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers 
in critical industries” (NSPD 54, 2008, 3). This view has greatly expanded in the intervening 
years, an absolutely critical addition is the social domain of cyber space, for example the US 
Army (2010, 8-9) based its view on cyber space on computers (including programmable units) 
and the connections between them, but added the virtual dimension formed by the interlink of 
those computers. The United Kingdom Cabinet Office (2011, 11-13) duly followed suit and 
referenced cybers space as a virtual domain, where individuals can interact with one another, 
leading to the exchange of ideas, information sharing, providing social support and trade among 
other things by using the global network.  
 
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence (Klimburg, 2012, 8-9) defines cyber-
space as something more than just internet and connected systems, hardware, software and in-
formation systems, as having a social component, including people and their interactions as 
well. Robinson, Disley, Potoglu, Reding, Culley, Penny, Botterman, Carpenter, Blackman and 
Millard (2012, 56-58) view cyberspace as reflecting partly a human construct, partly natural 
and partly informational constructs, but also as having a strong physical nature that reflects 
locality. As such the view on cyber space must be built on physical (i.e. the physical machines, 
devices and systems), logical (i.e. the virtual systems and their functions etc.) as well as social 
(i.e. the interactions of humans) domains. Rantapelkonen and Salminen (2013, 7) point out that 
actions in the cyber space are mostly run and managed by individual people and private organ-
izations, that it isn’t controlled by states. International organizations haven’t been able to exert 
much influence on control activities within the domain.  
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A widely accepted model of cyber space is the three-dimensional model by Libicki (2007, 8-
9), that separates cyber space into three separate, but interlinked domains. The three are: (1) 
physical layer (servers, wires, routers etc.), (2) syntactic or logical layer (software, protocols 
etc.) and (3) semantic or cognitive layer (information and ideas). The logical layer is usually 
today expanded to include the social aspects of cyber space, especially in relation to hybrid 
warfare (Lemieux, 2015, 22-23).  
 
The US Army (2010, 8-12) divides the functions related to network and spectrum operations 
into three dimensions: 
- Contest of Wills i.e. psychological operations against implacable foes, warring fac-
tions or potential adversaries 
- Strategic engagement i.e. keeping friends at home, gaining allies abroad and keeping 
up support for operations 
- Cyber-electromagnetic contest i.e. the dimension consisting of convergence of the 
wired, wireless and optical technologies 
The US Army model third dimension is clearly what we understand as the cyber space, but 
reminding us that there are other dimensions to cyber security as well. (US Army, 2010, 8-12.)  
 
Going further the US Army uses a very similar definition for cyber space as Libicki (2007), but 
defines the third dimension as Social layer, composed of the persona and cyber persona com-
ponents (US Army, 2010, 9). The social layer focuses more on persons identification (e-mail, 
IP Adress etc.) information to add a human element into the cyber space conundrum. As such, 
the US Army differs from Lemieux (2015, 22-23) model, by attaching the social aspect to log-
ical layer. 
 
 
Figure 1. Cyber space concept model according to US Army (Adapted from US Army, 2010, 
8.) 
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Within this study, the definition of cyber space will follow the US Army model, as a combina-
tion of three layers: (1) physical (servers, wires, routers etc.), (2) logical (software, protocols) 
and (3) social & cognitive (identities, information, ideas etc.). 
 
Cyber Threat 
According to Lemieux (2015, 19) the origins of cyber threats are caused through the complexity 
of information systems, that “…create unexpected vulnerabilities that human agents can use to 
make computer systems operate in unintended ways”. Kärkkäinen (in Vankka, 2013, 13-14) 
expands the two major ways for cyber threats to emerge in a cognitive network context: The 
view is that threats can emerge from systems itself, i.e. software vulnerabilities or process vul-
nerabilities that outside agents are able to exploit. On the other hand, threats can emerge from 
the outside agents, through attack methods, for example man-in-the-middle attacks. The may 
also be threats that combine the two, i.e. an outside agent exploiting a vulnerability.  
 
The US Army (2010, 13-14) categorizes cyber threats in many ways: (1) by sponsorship, (2) 
training, (3) education, (4) skills, (5) motivation, and (6) tools. For example, an advanced cyber 
threat can be sponsored by a nation-state and have advanced education. “The level of cyber 
threat is the combination of the actor’s ability (skills and resources), opportunity (access to 
target), intent (attack, surveillance, exploit), and motive (national policy, war, profit, fame, per-
sonal reasons, and others)”. (US Army, 2010.) 
 
Cyber-attack 
Defined by Chapple & Seidl (2015, 5-6) cyber-attacks are offensive acts that aim to cause phys-
ical or electronic damage by non-kinetic means. They also separate cyberwarfare into cyber-
attacks and cyber espionage, where the aim is to steal sensitive information. Cyber warfare 
consists of the above offensive actions as well as defending yourself against the adversary’s 
attacks. 
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Goldsmith (in Lemieux, 2015, 52) defines a cyber-attack as “an act that alter, degrades, or de-
stroys adversary computer systems or the information in or transiting through those systems”. 
He also differentiates cyber exploitation form an actual cyber-attack, where exploitation in-
volves no disruption, but rather just the monitoring and related espionage on computer system 
and the copying of this data. One wonders whether this differentiation is necessary, as the owner 
of the stolen data, that is essential to the computer system or its user, might not see the bright 
side of the lack of an attack upon his system. Rühle (in Friis & Ringsmose, 2016, xi-xii) raises 
an important view of cyber-attacks: while in physical world kinetic attacks are visible, in cyber 
space intrusion may go unnoticed for any length of time. As such cyber-attacks may turn out to 
be the first shots fired in any conflict, maybe years before escalation into the physical realm.  
 
We can define a cyber-attack as any purposeful action aimed at intrusion or exploitation of 
cyber infrastructure.  
 
Cyber Security 
Friis and Ringsmose (2016, 2-3) explain the difference between information security and cyber 
security through an example: “… Edward Snowden’s publication of sensitive documents from 
the NSA database is a breach in information security, not cyber security. However, had the 
same documents been stolen through an online attack on NSA’s servers, it would qualify as a 
cyber-attack.” The difference can be articulated as using cyber domain as it is supposed to 
work, i.e. Snowden had access to the documents, he was allowed to handle them, but the breach 
happens when he discloses them to an unauthorized party. No misuse or attack on cyber domain 
itself, but rather on the contents, i.e. information.  
 
The Telecommunications Standardization Sector of International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU-T) Study Group (2008, 6-8) defines cyber security as the collection of tools, policies, 
security concepts and safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches and actions, train-
ing, best practices, assurance and technologies that are used to protect the organisation’s infra-
structure and information related to the cyber space. This list includes roughly the same items 
as a definition of information security, but the difference between cyber and information comes 
from the domain that they relate: cyber security focuses solely on the organizational and user’s 
assets that are within the cyber domain, i.e. the connected computing devices, information 
within them, infrastructure, applications, services, telecommunication systems, users, and the 
totality of transmitted and/or stored information in the cyber environment. (ITU-T Study Group, 
2008.) 
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Andress and Winterfield (2014, 30-32) define cyber defence as a collection of information as-
surance, computer network defence, incident response and critical infrastructure protection, 
with the aim of preventing, detecting and responding to outside actor’s attempts to deny or 
manipulate information and/or infrastructure. In this context cyber defence is seen as a sub-
domain of cyber security. Following from the above definitions that see cyber as a three-level 
domain, we must add social defence into this view, which consists mainly of training and aware-
ness of cyber users. 
 
We can define cyber security according to literature as the actions with the aim of safeguarding 
the function and functionalities of the cyber domain. These include governance (e.g. frame-
works, guidelines, instructions), physical (e.g. protective cabinets, locks), logical (e.g. firewalls, 
virus protection), processes (e.g. monitoring, incident response) and social (e.g. training and 
awareness).  
 
3.1.2 Cyber Security – Government Publications 
 
Kaufmann (2013, 53-55) sees networking and being connected as integral to modern societies. 
This view has in the 2010s emerged as key component for modern nations, where it has emerged 
as one of the vital functions of modern society. This extends the view of national security to-
wards the virtual world and has brought cyber security within the scope on national actors. 
National security, however, is not a clear concept, changing with the times and evolving nation 
states. A classical view stemming from the French revolution defines security for the individual 
as feeling free from the prospect of personal violation, a very private view of security. As na-
tions evolved, the concept of national security grew to include the responsibility of the state to 
protect the individual and their rights. As such, the national security can be defined as the pro-
tection of the individual and his rights from all sudden and violent acts, internal and external, 
by the nation state. (Rothschild, 1995.) 
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Baldwin (1997, 5-6) finds the concept of national security as dangerously ambiguous, with the 
definition varying based on the needs of the definer. Wolfers (1952, 483) in his classic defini-
tion of security as “the absence of threats to acquired values” leaves a lot to interpretation, 
Baldwin (1997, 13) formulates this as “a low probability of damage to acquired values”. Na-
tional Security viewed this way can have no comprehensive definition, but rather provides a 
framework for a nation to define its values and build its own concept of national security. In 
this light, the notion of national security depends on both constitutional law and current legis-
lation and statues of an individual nation, based largely on the current beliefs and values of the 
state. These beliefs are obviously in constant flux, so any definition needs to be examined as a 
moment in time. 
 
The Constitution of Finland (1999/731) declares as the individual rights, among others, equal-
ity, the right to life, personal liberty and integrity, freedom of movement, the right to privacy, 
freedom of expression and right of access to information, electoral and participatory rights, 
protection of property and the right to work and the freedom to engage in commercial activity. 
This declaration, combined with the above definition of rights, forms the basis of Finnish na-
tional security. These are the rights and values that are to be protected from threats by the gov-
ernment. For a more in-depth look at how the nation state of Finland comprehends cyber secu-
rity, we will take a detailed look at four governmental publications: 
- The Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society (2006) 
- The Security Strategy for Society (2010, updated 2017) 
- Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy (2013) 
- Implementation Programme for Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy for 2017-2020 
(2017) 
 
The Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society 
The Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society form 2006 summarises that the three 
dimensions of functions vital to society are national sovereignty, the security of society and the 
livelihood of the population in all situations (Finnish Government, 2006).  
 
A more holistic view of the vital functions is as follows (Finnish Government, 2006): 
- Management of Government affairs 
- International activity 
- National military defence 
- Internal security 
- Functioning of economy and infrastructure 
- The population’s income security and capability to function 
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- Psychological crisis tolerance 
A quick analysis of this list produces aspects (national, international, technical, social) and ac-
tors (military, police, emergency services, governmental, private sector). National security in 
Finland is viewed as a holistic system, that involves all of society. National security strategy 
for society (Finnish Government, 2010) views the effort of upholding national security as a 
cooperative task, led by the government, but carried out in collaboration by governmental ac-
tors, national and local institutions and private sector. 
 
Due to the age of the document, cyber security or risks do not play a big part of the strategy. 
However, we can clearly see that all the functions deemed vital have a cyber component and 
quick analysis will tell us, that almost none can be achieved without cyber security in the year 
2017. Governmental affairs, military and economy and the income security of the people all 
run on IT-infrastructure and havoc may be wreaked upon them by cyber means exclusively. 
Fortunately, these lapses due to aging are addressed in the following documents.  
 
Interestingly, the threat scenarios presented in the 2006 strategy paper do not include infor-
mation security or cyber security at all. Rather, the strategy talks about disturbances against 
telecommunications or information systems. This shows the rapid evolution of cyber threats 
from 2006 to 2017. (Finnish Government, 2006.)  
 
The Security Strategy for Society 
Originally published in 2010 and recently updated in 2017, the Security Strategy for Society 
provides the guidelines for governmental entities, both national and local, for safeguarding na-
tional sovereignty and territorial integrity, based on comprehensive view of security for all so-
ciety. The main view of the strategy is to detail the vital functions of society, threat scenarios 
for these functions and tasks of preparedness and crisis management for the different actors. 
The document takes the functions listed in 2006 and updates them:  
- Management of Governmental Affairs 
- International Activity 
- Finland’s Defence Capability 
- Internal Security 
- Functioning of Economy and Infrastructure 
- The Population’s Income Security and Capability to Function 
- Psychological Crisis Tolerance 
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The differences between 2006 and 2010 lists of functions are superficial, rather based on dif-
ferent grouping of issues than true changes in the vital functions. This shows that while the 
world has changed plenty around us, the functions of the nation state have remained. Major 
changes, however, can be found in the threats articulated in the strategy. The emergence of 
cyber threats means that they are explicitly mentioned as the cause behind telecommunications 
and information systems major disturbances. The update of 2017 focuses the functions more, 
but the differences between the strategies are superficial. The main change relating to this study 
is the addition of preparedness to the functioning of the economy and infrastructure, an im-
portant addition regarding cyber security preparedness. (Finnish Government, 2010, 2017.) 
 
The strategy states the functions to ensure preparedness and functionality of the infrastructure 
as the strategic tasks of governmental actors. The critical functions of telecommunications must 
be secured and a basic level of security must be mandated by national regulation. The Situation 
awareness of the critical infrastructure is based on common criteria and must function continu-
ously. (Finnish Government 2010.) 
 
The strategy lists the following items, that can be understood as relating to national cyber secu-
rity: 
- Governmental Situation Awareness Office 
- Connections to Foreign Nations and International Organisations 
- Military Defence of Finland 
- Security of Emergency Services 
- Functioning of Financial Infrastructure 
- Functioning of Communications Infrastructure 
- Functioning of Governmental IT Infrastructure 
- Crisis Management and Situation Awareness 
- Emergency Communications 
In modern society, almost all the functions in the strategy run at least partly on ICT-infrastruc-
ture, and as such can be affected by cyber threats. Those listed above are the ones explicitly 
within the cyber realm and in the scope of this thesis. (Finnish Government, 2010.) 
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The above strategies form the basis for governmental cyber security strategy and the implemen-
tation programme, analysed below. The above documents and analysis create a framework for 
functions and actors as well as actions that need to be safeguarded by effective national cyber 
security, i.e. the documents present an asset identification of sorts, the crown jewels to protect. 
When it comes to actual cyber security or actions thereof, we need to take a closer look at the 
cyber intensive documents. 
 
Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy 
Published in 2013, Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy extends the framework of the previous 
publications to the cyber domain. The start is promisingly succinct (Finnish Government, 2013, 
1):  
 
“Cyber security means the desired end state in which the cyber domain is reliable and 
in which its functioning is ensured.” 
 
Here we have a definition of cyber security by the government: a functioning cyber domain. 
The cyber domain is defined as (Finnish Government, 2013, 1): 
 
“… interdependent, multipurpose electronic data processing environment...” 
 
Finland’s cyber security vision is based on safeguarding the vital functions of government pre-
sented in the previous chapters. These functions are to be secured from cyber threats in all 
situations. Additionally, a safe cyber domain is a competitive advantage for authorities and 
businesses. The goal is to be a global forerunner in cyber threat management and handling of 
disturbances caused by these threats. (Finnish Government, 2013.) 
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The Strategy deems that Government and different actors should have reliable, real-time situa-
tion picture that is communicated to all the actors within the cyber security sphere of Finland. 
Each ministry and administrative branch is responsible within their mandate and should aim to 
further the aims of the strategy within this mandate. The strategy aims for a shared situation 
awareness and national & international cooperation to build know-how. The means through 
which these aims are to be fulfilled include appropriate legislation and incentives, to ensure 
compliance from different actors. The Government must assign tasks, service models and man-
agement standards to authorities and business community to further the goals of cyber security. 
The key actions include establishing network of key actors, raising awareness, facilitating co-
operation and information sharing. (Finnish Government, 2013.) 
 
The governmental central situation awareness actor is the National Cyber Security Centre 
(NCSC-FI) under the Finnish Communication Regulatory Authority (FICORA)1. Police handle 
investigations related to cyber-crime. Military defence will be tasked with intelligence as well 
as cyber-attack and defence capabilities under the Ministry of Defence. These declarations are 
the closest we get to responsibilities within the strategy, no critical business actors are named, 
other than the tradition of history of close public-private cooperation, which must be main-
tained. (Finnish Government, 2013.)   
 
Like any good strategy, the Cyber Security Strategy is a vague vision of a well-functioning 
society; all actors working in cooperation for a cyber secure future. The reality, however, is that 
the high-minded concepts must be operationalized, cooperation facilitated and information 
sharing networks built. The strength, according to the strategy, is Finland’s history of a small, 
capable and collaborative country and the holistic security approach with a long history. How 
these previous successes will be transformed into the cyber domain? These questions are an-
swered in the Implementation Programme in the next chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Appendix 1 lists the governmental actors referenced within this thesis and their current (as of 04/2018) Finnish 
designations  
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Implementation Programme for Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy 
The Implementation Programme for Finland’s Cyber Security Strategy is a plan published by 
the Security Committee with the aim to implement the cyber security vision and the stated ten 
strategic goals. The Security Committee is a body working towards comprehensive security 
across the government and ministries, based under the Ministry of Defence. It coordinates pre-
paredness measures and the implementation of the new cyber security strategy. (Security Com-
mittee, 2017b.) 
 
The implementation programme is based on the Cyber Security Strategy as well as the 2017 
government research programme “Finland’s cyber security: the present state, vision, and the 
actions needed to achieve the vision”. As such the implementation programme draws its main 
guidelines form the cyber security strategy, but updates its actions based on the later study. As 
we have seen, cyber security and threats have evolved during the five or so years since the 
publication of the original strategy paper. (Security Committee, 2017a.) 
 
The Implementation programme is built on three items as its cyber security vision 
- Finland can secure its vital functions against cyber threats in all situations. 
- Citizens, the authorities and businesses can effectively utilise a safe cyber domain and 
the competence arising from cyber security measures, both nationally and internation-
ally. 
- By 2016, Finland is the global forerunner in cyber threat preparedness and in manag-
ing the disturbances caused by these threats  
(Security Committee, 2017a, 7.) 
This vision frames the view on national cyber security: (1) securing the vital functions, (2) safe 
cyber domain and (3) effective preparedness and incident management.  
 
The implementation programme repeats the aims of the Cyber Security Strategy, grouping the 
initiatives to achieve these goals into three: (1) Leadership to ensure that the Cyber Security 
Vision is realized, (2) Society’s vital digitalised functions will be assured and (3) The cyber 
competence of citizens, the business community and the public sector will contribute security 
to digitalisation. The drive to transform cyber security is based on leadership, mainly by the 
government, in creating effective management and steering structures, models and legislation 
in addition to providing holistic situation awareness. Assurance of digital functions will be en-
sured by administrative and technological actions and the cyber competence development will 
ensure compliance within the cooperative actors (citizens, business community and public sec-
tor). (Security Committee, 2017a.) 
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The implementation programme expands the list of central actors to national cyber security, 
among them Prime Minister’s office, all the ministries, The Secretariat of the Security Com-
mittee and the committee itself, Authorities (police, army etc.), Government ICT Centre (Val-
tori), counties, National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA) and the National Cyber Security 
Centre Finland (NCSC-FI) under FICORA (Security Committee, 2017a). The programme can-
not delegate actions to private actors, so specific firms are not listed within these, but the scope 
of the programme shows that the gravity of the issue has expanded since the formulation of the 
strategy. 
 
The leadership domain of the program consists of creating a holistic framework to govern the 
national cyber security, with effective legislation, guidelines, international cooperation, public-
private collaboration backed-up by implementation of major cyber incident management 
model, comprising of cyber security situation picture, effective information sharing and moni-
toring and responding to cyber security incidents (Security Committee, 2017a). The leadership 
of national cyber security is on one side to provide regulation and guidance, but on the other 
act as the vanguard of cyber security in cases of emergency. The government must facilitate 
holistic cooperation and information sharing not only between public and private entities, but 
possibly even competitors (e.g. two network service providers), not an easy task. Effective and 
secure lines of communication, vulnerability and incident reporting structures need to be estab-
lished, where confidentiality is paramount.  
 
The assurance domain requires the safeguarding of vital digital functions of society, established 
through identification of these functions and stakeholders and protecting the critical infrastruc-
ture. Within the domain, we find functions such as electricity, telecommunications, security of 
supply and data protection. The domain extends to preparedness and business continuity within 
these functions, with security audit responsibilities assigned to make certain the level of security 
is acceptable. (Security Committee, 2017a.) The domain consists of the majority actual work 
within the programme, with major challenges in identifying and protecting the vital functions. 
The programme actions reveal the lack of clarity to the cyber domain, as asset identification is 
a major part. When it comes to cyber domain and security, this is natural, as something defined 
and identified, may be obsolete in a year. However, for our task of defining cyber security 
within the national context, this proves problematic.  
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The final domain deals with developing cyber competence among citizens, business community 
and public sector, to make sure digitalisation initiatives are completed securely. The two parts 
within this domain are the provisioning of a secure growth platform for digital businesses and 
cyber security training and exercises to improve awareness and provide actionable intelligence 
on actual cyber capabilities. (Security Committee, 2017a.) The third domain ensures that the 
actions of the previous two domains fall on fertile ground and there is ample awareness both 
within the citizens and the public and private sectors.  
 
The implementation programme underlines the challenge that is the definition of cyber security 
within the national context. The problem is twofold: (1) what are the vital functions at any point 
in time? and (2) what does it mean to secure these functions? (For instance:  in the case of 
communications: are different messaging applications vital or only one of them? Which one? 
Do we regard SMS as a viable back-up? Will we regard SMS viable in ten years?) We must 
accept that national cyber security changes as a function of time and technological and socio-
logical development, what is critical today may be obsolete tomorrow. Whit these restrictions 
in mind, we must move on to conclude our journey through the cyber realm. 
 
3.1.3 Conclusion 
 
Cyber as a concept is at best muddled, but major problems arise from the fact that as a domain, 
cyber is under constant change. Cyber changes as a function of time, people, technology and 
processes evolve and affect change throughout the cyber domain, its technological levels and 
even people who operate within the domain. If we understand this complexity, we can make 
decision on how to form our definition: we must handle in generalization of some sort, to be 
able to steer clear of instant outdating of our concepts. 
 
Cyber security is the safeguarding of cyber environment, which has multiple levels. At this 
moment, the levels can be defined as: (1) physical, (2) logical and (3) social, following e.g. 
from the US Army (2010) and Libicki (2007). The cyber threats and risks confronting the do-
main may be focused on any level and effects may manifest on any level, i.e. physical threats 
with social effects are possible and vice versa. Cyber security controls include governance, 
physical, logical, processes and social.  
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On a national level cyber security is a challenge of public-private cooperation and coordination. 
Much of the infrastructure is run and developed by private actors, mainly for private customers, 
but the development of the last few decades has seen life-supporting services move to IT-sys-
tems and online services. Nutrition is still maintained by physical food; logistics, distribution 
and payment services rely on functioning IT-infrastructure. This dichotomy must always be 
kept in mind when talking about cyber security on a national level, the government can only 
safeguard a small part of the cyber infrastructure, rest is secured through interaction and co-
operation with private entities or through legislation and regulation. 
 
The governmental approach to cyber security is very similar to the one that we have seen in the 
literature. The initiatives, however, suffer from similar problems as our cyber definitions: how 
to deal with the time component and avoid issues with outdating? The government deals with 
these issues in two ways: (1) the documents are high-level and vague purposefully, and (2) they 
are updated regularly. As a consequence, we must engage in some interpretation as we move 
towards a view on national cyber security situation awareness, but as a whole the governmental 
papers have given us a solid footing to base our further study on. 
 
3.2 Situation Awareness and Understanding 
 
To be able to understand Situation Understanding (SU), we must step back and take a wider 
look at Situation Awareness (SA) as whole. SA and SU are related concepts and as such we 
must be able to remain within clearly defined boxes for them, in order not to obfuscate the 
discussion. We find that some of the discussion around SA and SU, even Situation Comprehen-
sion (SC) is sometimes used, fail because the definitions are unclear between the parties in the 
discussion. Looking at SU through the lens of SA-research will give us structure to separate 
them in an orderly manner.  
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Situation awareness (SA) provides the ability to identify what has happened and is happening 
(UK Ministry of Defence, 2016b, 5). Usually understood within the context of a decision-mak-
ing-cycle or -process, the function of being aware of the elements and actions unfolding around 
oneself, to create an understanding that decisions can be based on known as SA is vital. Nofi 
(2000, 71) formulates a general definition of situation awareness as the development of a dy-
namic mental model of ones environment. In the complex world turning at a lightning pace, 
understanding of the situation around us is key to successful decision-making. The real benefit 
of SA, according to Endsley (in Garland, Wise & Hopkins, 1999, 258), is not improved perfor-
mance, but rather the management of inherent risk of a performance error.  
 
Up-to-date SA provides sound understanding of current status and a robust base for building 
Situation Understanding and further the basis for decision making. Situation understanding 
(SU) can be understood as sub-phase of complete SA-process (for example: Endsley & Garland, 
2000), but in the scope of this thesis we will define Situation Understanding as having a suffi-
cient level of knowledge to draw inferences and possible consequences from SA information 
(Alberts, Gartska, Hayes & Signori, 2001, 18-19). The further definition arises that SA is the 
rather mechanistic building of current and past events, whereas the true meaning of SU is to 
bring context to the SA-picture and provide basis for projection of future events, giving the 
observer a base for decision making and action (Endsley, 1995, 35-37). 
 
3.2.1 Situation Awareness 
 
Emergence of situation awareness research was based on the operational needs of more detailed 
understanding of SA. The pioneers have been aviation, both pilots and air traffic control, indus-
trial plants and emergency services, but slowly and surely SA-thinking has penetrated almost 
any field, powered by the challenges of technological development. Currently one of the biggest 
fields developing SA-based thinking is the cyber security, where networked systems are pro-
ducing information and these solutions are supported by the increasing computing power and 
focus on system usability. (Endsley & Garland, 2000, 1-2.) 
 
Situation awareness is defined by Endsley (1988, 97-101) as: 
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“…the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, 
the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near fu-
ture.” 
 
The above definition comprises three dimensions: (1) perception of the current situation as a 
factor of space and time, (2) the comprehension of the situation based on the perceptions and 
(3) the projection of the future situation based on the previous dimensions. The work to define 
situation awareness has its root in operative functions, such as airplane piloting or emergency 
services, which can be seen from the definition, with its focus on time as a dimension. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Dimensions of Situation Awareness according to Endsley (Adapted from Endsley, 
1995, 35.) 
 
The levels of SA can be described as follows (Endsley, 1995, 36-37): 
- The first level is perception, the act of perceiving the status, attributes and dynamics of 
situation elements. The processes in use are monitoring and recognition of relevant el-
ements. The SA consists of multiple SA elements (objects, events, people etc.) and 
their current states 
- The second level is comprehension. It is the process of synthesizing the perception of 
the aforementioned elements into a single, overarching understanding of the status of 
the elements, the interaction between the elements and understanding how these ele-
ments affect the observer and their goals and objectives. 
- The third level is projection. Projection is the capability to project the future actions of 
the environments elements. The projection phase requires the robust base of the previ-
ous levels, combined with the ability to extrapolate the actions and functions of the el-
ements and how this will affect the relevant states.  
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In Endsley’s model SA can be understood in two ways: (1) SA as the process of perception, 
comprehension and projection, or (2) SA as result and the end state of SA-process, for example 
Wickens (2008, 398-399) defines SA as the process of updating SA where SU is the end result. 
The duality of the concept of SA is important to understand and keep in mind, especially when 
we move towards the Shared Situation Awareness and SA in cyber context. Defined this way 
the SA-process is an ongoing function, updating constantly, whereas SA-as-a-result can be 
thought more as a snapshot in time, documentable as a report for instance, that can be used as 
the basis for building Situation Understanding.  
 
In the military context, SA-thinking has been popularized mainly by Colonel (ret.) John R. 
Boyd through his developing of OODA-loop as concept of the decision cycle. Boyd’s creation 
of the OODA-loop has its roots in aviation as well, as a former fighter pilot, the goal of his 
theory was to achieve success in air-to-air combat. In his later years, Boyd expanded his think-
ing into general military theory, overall military command-and-control, and was able to find 
many areas of combat, from strategic to tactical and operative level, where his model was ef-
fective. Boyd’s work was later adapted to many different fields, such as business, by his close 
colleagues, known as acolytes. The essence of the OODA-loop is the creation of overwhelming 
decision-making ability to dominate the battlespace. (Coram, 2002 & Richards, 2004.) 
 
Analysing the OODA-loop, the situation awareness is a combination of Observe and Orient-
phases, that can both lead (in Boyd’s theory the aim is to automate as much as possible, i.e. 
move from phase to phase faster, or to truly dominate your enemy, skip entire phases to jump 
straight from Observation to Action) to the Action-phase. In Boyd’s thinking SA is divided into 
the two O-phases, with Observe concerned with looking from the inside out and collecting 
information; while Orient is concerned with analysis and internal comprehension of the situa-
tion. As a system, the Boyd SA more attuned to the operative needs of actors who require quick 
decisions, but as a framework for strategic thinking bolstered by some additional concepts, 
Boyd showed that it can work for strategic command as well. (Boyd 1986, 1987 & 1995.) 
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Figure 3. Observe and Orient by Boyd (Adapted from Boyd, 1995.) 
 
In Boyd’s model the duality of SA-as-process or SA-as-a-result are somewhat more muddled 
than in Endsley’s, as the model is a dynamic, interchanging model of a thought-process. In 
Boyd’s process, most of the phases are automatic when comprehension is at a high enough 
state, and as such the separation of these two elements on a fundamental level becomes harder. 
For the scope of this thesis, the dual view of SA prevails. However, Boyd’s model has some 
important elements, that are beneficial to understanding SA in the cyber context especially: (1) 
understanding of friction as a key element arising from ambiguity, deception and uncertainty 
and (2) concept of schwerpunkt as orientation, where a common view and goals function to 
reduce friction, where this common goal acts as pull-together factor for all actors. The benefit 
of Boyd’s thinking is that he sees the decision-making loop from a higher level as well and 
through his thinking we can take a view of how to improve cyber SA. (Boyd, 1987.) 
 
Comparing the two models, it is clear that semantically they fit together very well. Endsley’s 
Perception- and Comprehension-levels can be understood in a similar frame to Boyd’s Observe- 
and Orient-phases. The actions within the boxes are quite similar, and the aims and results work 
in similar vein. The difference can be seen in the final level and phase; Endsley’s Projection is 
inherently a function of SA-process, when Boyd’s Decide- and Act-phases move him out of a 
strict SA-frame and into the area of decision making. For our purposes in this study, the SA-
frame will be understood as the combination of Endsley’s Comprehension and Projection-levels 
as well as Boyd’s Orient-phase.  
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Figure 4. Side-by-side comparison of the two SA-models (adapted from Endsley 1995 & Boyd, 
1995). 
 
3.2.2 Situation Understanding 
 
Situation Understanding (SU), within the context of SA-process, is the comprehension of the 
current situation, the observation of the elements within and their elements, the interactions of 
the elements and the effects of the elements on the observer’s goals and objectives. The com-
prehension phase is interpreting information and creating context and understanding, with pro-
jection of what happens next based on the current information. The point of level 2 comprehen-
sion, is to be able to derive relevant meaning and significance from data (Level 1 perception). 
The difference of SA perception and understanding comes from assigning objective signifi-
cance and importance to collected data. (Endsley 1988 & 1995, Endsley & Garland 2000.) 
 
Alberts et al. (2001, 18-24) look at SA and SU in military context and conclude that situation 
awareness deals with what can be understood from the situation historically and in the present, 
whereas the situation understanding deals with analysing how the situation is developing and 
how it may develop in the future. In similar vein, Cooper (in Johnson & Libcicki, 1995, 103-
105) has constructed a view of SA based on levels of information and knowledge. The Cooper 
model presents the SA as cognitive model, where raw data is turned first into information and 
through SA-process into SA and SU itself. Endsley (in Kott, 2008, 96-98) states that the second 
level of SA moves the individual from observing the presence of elements within the situation, 
to understanding the meaning of the elements and their interactions in relation to their goals 
and requirements, calling it Situation Understanding.  
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Figure 5. Information in relation to SA-levels (Adapted from Cooper, in Johnson & Libicki 
1995, 103-105.) 
 
The emergence of SU is a process, that is based on the ability, of the individual or the system, 
to receive, gather, analyze and use information. Understanding rising from the analysis of gath-
ered information, leads to decision and action. SU is always situation dependent, based on the 
internal models, experiences, training and other factors, that combine with the information 
available and the SA-actor’s ability to handle that information. The emergence of SU is pre-
sented below in Figure 6. (Sinkkonen, Kuoppala, Parkkinen, & Vastamäki, 2006, 88-89 & Nofi, 
2000, 20-22.) 
 
 
Figure 6. Emergence of Situation Understanding (Adapted from Sinkkonen et al. 2006 & Nofi 
2000.) 
 
Boyd (Richards, 2004, Chapter 7) spoke a lot about implicit direction of the loop, as internalized 
factors mould the process of SA for each unique SA-actor. Boyd’s main thesis was that winning 
comes not from accumulative SA-process to gather a higher SA-balance and gain competitive 
advantage. Rather he emphasized the implicit over explicit; “to gain a favourable mismatch in 
friction and time.” (Boyd, 1987) This raises the significance of true SU, where the current sit-
uation is turned immediately into comprehension and understanding of the options for action. 
Central to Boyd’s OODA is acting on true SU enables the actor to unleash the unexpected, to 
blindside to adversary and gain an upper hand. Boyd’s view is especially valuable in the cyber 
context, as knowledge of one’s own assets, their function and interdependencies has a major 
effect on cyber incidents. 
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Understanding is always built on the observer’s existing mental models, previous experiences, 
current analysis and even current mental state. These individual and shared factors can have a 
major impact on SA-comprehension, and must be considered. Boyd’s Orient-phase has a built-
in pentagon of elements that must be factored in: (1) cultural traditions, (2) genetic heritage, (3) 
analyses and synthesis, (4) new information and (5) previous experience. Endsley (1988 & 
1995) talks about the effects of ideology and mental models on comprehension. The combined 
factors form the two writers are presented below, in Figure 7. The different elements affecting 
the situation awareness result in vastly different interpretations of the SA. For example, two 
organisations will view the SA through their own lens, based on the history, current situation 
and capabilities.  
 
 
Figure 7. Factors affecting the emergence of SA (adapted from Boyd 1995 & Endsley et al. 
2000.) 
 
The sources of information for SA comprehension are various. The value of different sources 
is clear, with understanding of both the value of observed sources but also the sources of mental 
models that assist in interpreting the collected information. The true value of SA understanding 
comes from finding the relevant information within the oceans of data, that we are capable of 
collecting in today’s world. This phenomenon is known as the Information Gap and is described 
below, as a rule we should always understand that more data does not necessarily mean more 
information. Rather, the quality of analysis and interpretation gives meaning to data. (Endsley 
& Garland, 2000.) 
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Figure 8. The Information Gap (adapted from Endsley & Garland, 2000, 2.) 
 
Nissinen (in Vankka, 2015, 48) frames the issue of SA breakdown caused by excessive data 
flow and excess information as common to today’s world of digital information and computing 
power. The purpose of SA is to filter the information from data, through definition of SA re-
quirements and SA processes to provide a framework for all SA actors. Beyond the framework, 
precedence is given to exchange of information and SA systems that support this communica-
tion. This is echoed by Khrons-Välimäki (in Vankka, 2015, 45) and the three issues of design 
principles for SA: (1) how to organize information, (2) how to process information, and (3) 
principles for designing user interfaces for SA. Haapanen (in Vankka, 2015, 35-37) treads sim-
ilar paths by his three groups of design principles for SA: (1) how information should be orga-
nized, (2) how information should be processed and (3) how to improve the SA of the operator 
for SSA. Both views underline the importance of information and open communication for SA 
is critical. (Vankka, 2015.) 
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3.2.3 Shared Situation Awareness 
 
Nofi (2000, 26-27) furthers the definition of situation awareness to shared SA by simply ex-
tending the dynamic mental model to a group dynamic mental model. The aim of Shared Situ-
ation Awareness (SSA) is to provide a common view of the situation, based on common goals, 
requirements and aims. As Sinkkonen et al. (2006, 88-89) points out, it is impossible for a single 
actor to share their SA completely, as SA is based on internal factors of an SA-actor. The more 
homogenous the SSA-group is, the beneficial the circumstances for successfully creating SSA. 
However, the SSA must be based on common ground, the factors that are shared by all the 
actors within the group: training, employment, similar experiences, assumptions (Nofi, 2000, 
49-52). This common ground is essentially the platform that SSA must be built on and in or-
ganizational actors can also be based on commonly agreed on goals or requirements. The SSA 
can differ greatly from individual-SA, as the goal of individual-SA can be vastly different from 
SSA. However according to Endsley & Jones (1997, 49) common SA requirements are the basis 
for SSA, where all team members maintain the same SA, based on these common goals and 
requirements.  
 
Figure 9. below presents the SSA-model by Endsley and Jones (1997), where A, B and C are 
team members with their own individual SA. AB, AC and BC represent the common SA created 
by the members of the team, these arise as a by-product of aiming for team SSA. ABC is the 
team SSA, where you have the shared requirements and the common goal for SSA. Salas, Dick-
inson, Converse and Tannerbaum (in Sweazy & Salas, 1992) have studied the emergence of SA 
in military units, where each individual has a defined role and responsibilities. The most im-
portant defining factors of SSA in this context was the common goals, interdependency and 
specialized roles and duties (Sweazy & Salas, 1992). The group SSA can be described as the 
SA level, that each actor in the team has achieved based on their own role and goal within the 
group (Endsley & Jones, 1997). The key to successful SSA is a common goal, from which 
individual duties and requirements are derived for each actor within the group.  
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Figure 9. Shared Situation Awareness (adapted from Endsley & Jones, 1997, 47.) 
 
Panteli and Kirschen lay out the requirements for each level of SSA, that are presented in Table 
1. below. Level 1 requires the actors to have awareness of the system and environment in addi-
tion to being aware of the status of the other team members. On level 2, comprehension, the ask 
of the actor’s is to perceive the goals and requirements of themselves and others in the group, 
and understanding of the impact of own actions on others and vice versa. Level 3 is simply the 
foresight of future actions of team members and acting accordingly. (Panteli & Kirschen, 2015, 
140-151.) 
 
Table 1. Shared situation awareness requirements (adapted from Panteli & Kirschen 2015, 140-
151) 
Level 1: Perception System 
Environment 
Other team members 
Level 2: Comprehension Status relevant to own goals/requirements 
Status relevant to other’s goals/requirements 
Impact of own actions on others 
Impact of other’s actions on self and overall 
goal 
Level 3: Projection Actions of team members 
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3.2.4 Situation Awareness in Cyber Context 
 
The view of SA and SU in the previous chapters is universal, not relating to any particular 
domain. We are, however, interested mostly in cyber space as a domain and national cyber 
security as a specific target for our view of generating SA and producing SU. Tadda & Salerno 
(in Jajodia, Liu, Swarup & Wang, 2010, 27-28) state that Cyber SA is dependent on the level 
of the observer, i.e. network administrator will have different needs compared to a higher level 
cyber manager in an organization. The issue is that SA as a product may be a single view or 
system that collates all the SA-relevant information, but SU is much more varied within the 
organization. 
 
Richard Kugler (in Kramer, Starr & Wentz, 2009, 333) views the cyber situation awareness for 
deterrence in the case of a national actor (specifically USA) to be based mainly on outside 
observation of the threat landscape and adversaries, comprising of five types of knowledge: 
- identification of cyber threats 
- assessment of motives, goals and calculations of adversaries 
- appraisal of calculations, judgements and external pressures that might lead to adver-
sary refraining from action 
- awareness of potential adversaries’ assets, capabilities and vulnerabilities 
- all-source intelligence for attribution of crisis situations 
 
The Kugler-view of SA is firmly in the “know your enemy” part of “sun tzunian”-art of war 
and lacks the internal view of knowing yourself (Sun-Tzu, 2002). SA defined by The Compre-
hensive National Cyber Security Initiative (2009, 3-4) complements Kugler’s view by conclud-
ing that shared situation awareness consists of understanding network vulnerabilities, threats 
and events within the federal government, state, local and tribal governments as well as private 
sector partners. They make it clear that cyber-SA requires effective maintenance of cyber-ca-
pabilities within complex distributed infrastructures in changing cyber landscape (Harrop and 
Matteson, in Lemieux, 2015, 161). Cyber-SA requires both the understanding of internal situa-
tion as well as knowledge of the external situation, there cannot be true SA without both. This 
leads to concerns over data vs. information and data overload, as Tadda & Salerno (in Jajodia 
et al. 2010, 27-29) highlight the current situation challenge as lower level, technical SA-data 
overwhelming the decision makers cognitive ability. The need is to clarify the requirements of 
SA-data on different (for example operative, tactical and strategic) levels of decision making, 
that require different type of data as input into the decision-making cycle. 
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Tadda & Salerno (in Jajodia et al., 2010, 27-28) stress the importance of understanding an or-
ganizations field of operations, that will bring its own requirements and threats. Trying to un-
derstand the national requirements; an organization that is critical to societal functions will have 
a wholly different view to cyber security than a firm with no obligations towards the functioning 
of national infrastructure. Even if Tadda & Salerno (in Jajodia et al., 2010, 28.) define environ-
mental information as network topology and the collection of data associated with this topol-
ogy, we will need to look at SA and SU in a wider scope. Especially looking at the strategic 
level SU, the importance of local, technical understanding is limited and needs to be interpreted 
through the meaning of such information to the bigger organisational picture of cyber security.   
 
Bradford, Dacier, Dietterich, Fredrikson, Giffin, Jajodia, Jha, Li, Liu, Ning, Ou, Song, Strater, 
Swarup, Tadda, Wang & Yen (in Jajodia et al., 2010, 4-6) view the internal situation as critical 
to SA, with internal infrastructure information, attack vector, anomaly detection and attack de-
tection as especially important. They provide seven aspects, that at least must be present for 
cyber SA: (1) Awareness of current situation (perception), (2) Impact of the Attack, (3) Aware-
ness of how the situation evolves, (4) Awareness of adversary behaviour, (5) Awareness of why 
and how the current situation was caused, (6) Awareness of the quality of perception and 
knowledge-intelligence-decision relating to the situation and (7) Assessment of possible futures 
of the current situation. For one to be able to build and maintain SU in cyber context a thorough 
understanding of oneself must be in place, otherwise understanding the possible attack vectors, 
vulnerabilities and consequences of attacks is impossible. This, however, is not enough: there 
must also be an understanding of the outside forces, means and motivations. Low level SU 
within an organization might be reachable by understanding the systems, processes and people 
within it, but to reach a high level of SU this rudimentary information must be complemented 
by the understanding of internal complexities and dependencies within, the criticality of infor-
mation and systems and the outside attackers and their motivations and means (Jajodia et al. 
2010, 3-7).  
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As both Boyd and Endsley (2000) view time as a critical part of SA and especially SU, in the 
cyber SU time must also be of critical importance. This emphasizes the ability to monitor and 
react to detected anomalies, and at the same time understand that every second allowed to the 
adversary to act makes detection and reaction more challenging. Lehto & Limnéll (2017, 199) 
stress the same view with emphasis on a real-time SA that supports Shared-SA in the network 
of critical actors. Their conclusion is that by providing real-time SA and understanding adver-
sary operations, capabilities and goals will one reach a decision-making ability to outmaneuver 
the opponent.  
 
3.2.5 Conclusion 
 
Situation Awareness as a concept has been defined from multiple angles, the two main views 
of this thesis are the SA-process oriented view by Endsley and the more decision making ori-
ented view of Boyd’s OODA-loop. Both views provide insight into the definition of Situation 
Understanding, which can be summarized as the understanding of the current situation and the 
projection of its future status. The three dimensions of SA-as-a-concept (vs- the SA-as-a-pro-
cess) need to be kept in mind as they support each other: (1) level 1 Situation Awareness, (2) 
level 2 Situation Comprehension and (3) level 3 Situation Understanding.  
 
The complexities within the SA-process need to be considered when trying to identify prereq-
uisites to Situation Understanding. A view of the operating environment, required information 
and capability to analyse the collected information are all vital. Similarly, the factors affecting 
the building of Situation Understanding, both inherent and external, are relevant. The true value 
of Situation Understanding comes through identification, collection and analysis of the truly 
important information, hidden in oceans of data that are available in our modern, interconnected 
computerized world. 
 
Shared Situation Awareness is more complex than just combining the SA of the individuals of 
the group. Rather, you need to consider the factor affecting the group dynamic, i.e. the differ-
ences of the individuals, be it cultural, educational or geographical. At the same time, it is es-
sential for the group to have shared interests in building the SA. These include commonly 
agreed goals or common defined requirements, as well as the aims of the SA. Shared Situation 
Awareness needs to benefit the individual parties as well. 
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In the cyber context, SA is very dependent on the level of the observer, a low level technical 
SA is completely different from organizational strategic SA. Similarly, in cyber context the 
mapping of essential information is critical, operative level systems produce streams on data 
that need to be analysed and broken down into actionable inputs to the cyber SA-process. The 
cyber SA requires understanding of both internal and external information, internal situation 
and system knowledge is essential to provide framework and context for actionable infor-
mation, but there also needs to be an understanding of external threats and actors. 
 
4 EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
 
This chapter will present the empirical research portion of this thesis, mainly the interviews and 
analysis of the interview content. First the interview methodology is presented as well as the 
interviewees to provide an overview of the research. Then analysis methods are presented, 
based on the abductive research method. Finally, the results of the interviews are presented in 
a similar structure as our guiding principles in the previous chapter. 
 
4.1 Interviews 
 
The themes of the interviews were based on the research questions and the two main guiding 
principles of cyber security and situation understanding. The interview themes were bound to 
a hypothetical situation of strategic level threat intelligence exchange within the network to 
provide concrete context and basis for the interview discussions. Strategic level threat intelli-
gence also provided leeway to stay clear of security operations or even incident management 
processes within the interviewee organizations, as these processes may over-ride the situation 
awareness function. On a strategic level they enable us to have a separation from technical level, 
which provides an opportunity to look at true Situation Understanding and the usage of that 
understanding. Strategic communication will not be high priority in terms of speed, but rather 
will provide the study with an actual view of cooperation between the organizations in the study. 
(Rantapelkonen & Koistinen, 2016.) 
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The data collected through the interviews was broken down in the themes created for the inter-
views and analysed through the prism of the theoretical understanding of the issues laid out in 
the previous chapter. The data was analysed using critical logic, which looks at the relation of 
the theoretical premises and the collected facts (Peirce 1931-1958 & 1958). The validity of the 
study is based on the soundness of the researchers use of the data and the ways it is presented, 
using abductive analysis the assumption is that the data is always valid, even the internal con-
tradictions within it (Grönfors, 2011, 20). The credibility of the study will be based on multiple 
factors: (1) the credibility of used sources and their coverage of the research topic, (2) the use 
of the sources by the student and (3) the credibility of analysis of the data (Rantapelkonen & 
Koistinen, 2016). 
 
The interviewees were selected to provide a sub-section of the whole national security network 
of actors, to maintain a manageable sample but at the same time provide a large enough group 
to provide valid conclusions. The interviewees were also selected to operationalize the view of 
national cyber security, in so far as the network of national cyber security is based on a numer-
ous of organizations, private and public. No one actor has a holistic, all-encompassing picture 
of national cyber security, but rather the situation awareness is built on numerous pieces of the 
bigger puzzle, all the responsibility of different organizations. 
 
Interviewees were selected based on the model of national cyber security presented in the pre-
vious chapters. The governmental actors are explicitly in the governmental documents and their 
cyber security responsibilities are based on legislation, as we shall see form the analysis of the 
interviews. The private actors are a different case, with their cyber security functions are based 
on a mix of the need to support and upkeep business functions and different regulations posed 
on them by different actors.  
 
Interviews were conducted with representatives from the following actors: 
- Government: 
- Communications Regulatory Authority (NCSC-FI) 
- Government Situation Awareness Office 
- National Emergency Supply Agency 
- Infrastructure provider: Energy infrastructure Provider 
- Infrastructure provider: Telecommunications Provider 
- A preparedness critical firm: Banking Group 
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The interviews were conducted with the representatives of the actors. The interviewees were 
provided with the interview themes beforehand, but only on a high level. The interviews were 
taped and transcribed. The transcribed interviews were then sent to the interviewees, who vali-
dated them to ensure the content was representative of the interview discussion. The interviews 
were conducted in Finnish, where possible a direct translation is used. If no direct translation 
was available, there was considerable effort to preserve the spirit of the quote. 
 
4.2 Analysis 
 
This chapter will present the interview findings as per the guiding principles presented in the 
previous chapter. First there is an analysis of how the different parties view cyber security and 
how they are connected to the national cyber security network. Then the situation understanding 
is assessed, how the parties analyse and draw conclusions from situation awareness to build 
situation understanding. The following chapters are based on the interviews, unless a specific 
source is denoted. Direct quotes from the interviews are presented in italics and contain source 
information of the which interview the quote is from. 
 
4.2.1 Actors 
 
The actors interviewed are presented shortly in this chapter. Included is a short background 
information on why they need to address cyber security and what are the main drivers for each 
actor. 
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NCSC-FI 
The National Cyber Security Centre of Finland (NCSC-FI) is the main operative cyber security 
actor of the Finnish government, situated within the Finnish Communications Regulatory Au-
thority (FICORA). FICORA is tasked with developing and monitoring the operational reliabil-
ity and security of communications networks and services (FICORA, 2018) and NCSC-FI is 
the specialist organization within the authority responsible for cyber security situation aware-
ness within the communications network and services. NCSC-FIs mandate is based on legisla-
tion, which explicitly frames the functions scope as the de facto cyber security regulatory au-
thority within Finland. According to the interviews, the role of the NCSC-FI is twofold: (1) to 
act as the Governmental Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) with the responsibility 
to monitor, respond to and solving different security incidents, violations and threats, and (2) 
cyber security regulatory authority with the mandate to produce binding guidance and policies 
within the scope of FICORA (i.e. the communications networks and services, so the binding 
guidance is usually pointed towards the telecommunications providers within Finland). This 
role is unique to Finland, according to the interview there aren’t many similar mandates, where 
the operative function also has a mandate to create binding guidance. 
 
The ability to provide binding guidance, especially expedited through established networks, is 
a huge enabler for the NCSC-FIs functions, as the authority can respond quickly to cyber secu-
rity threats within the national communications infrastructure. This enables NCSC-FI to for 
example instruct telecommunications providers to enable certain filtering functions within their 
networks, to counter certain threats. In cases, where NCSC-FI can identify distinct technical 
solutions to a threat, they can roll out the deployment very quickly to their network of organi-
zations and set up mitigation efforts. This is based mainly on Finnish legislation (Information 
Society Code) and the NCSC-FI status as a regulatory authority, where the authority acts as the 
situation awareness centrality and identificatory of incidents. When solutions arise, they can 
bind different actors to roll them out. 
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The NCSC-FI functions mostly on an operative level, building situation awareness and provid-
ing insight to different actors within their networks. They mostly cooperate with organizations 
related to the communications network and services, but as the communications infrastructure 
is key to the functioning of different public and private organizations, these networks are ex-
tensive within the national realm. However, their expertise and insight is mainly limited to 
communications related issues and their mitigation. They do provide some higher-level guid-
ance and reporting, but this is limited to few times per year, most of NCSC-FI focus is on daily 
functions and operative actions. 
 
Government Situation Awareness Office (VNK SA-office) 
The VNK SA-office is a governmental actor tasked with providing situation understanding to 
governmental leadership, mostly to the prime minister and the cabinet. Their mandate is based 
on law and their aim is to produce wide-scope SU-information on all topics that may affect the 
country and may need governmental actions. The goal is to collect a lot of information from 
different sources (governmental, NCSC-FI, police agencies, the defence forces, foreign sources 
etc.) and provide objective analysis for governmental decision making. Cyber security is one 
topic, but its role is limited, as one topic among many. VNK SA-office acts as a central node 
for governmental SA and SU, co-operating with many different actors and exchanging infor-
mation within this network.  
 
VNK SA-office functions mostly on tactical and strategic level, providing SU-information for 
decision making. The office stays out of the decision making itself, providing as objective in-
formation as possible, basing the collection and analysis on expert sources. The office itself 
tries to stay away from interpretation of the results, rather looking to be the provider of infor-
mation. The governmental entities will make their own conclusions and decide on the actions 
required. Cyber security is just one topic the SA-office is monitoring, so it uses a lot of the other 
governmental functions to provider deeper understanding into the issues. For cyber, NCSC-FI 
is close collaborator, providing deep understanding and analysis in cyber incidents. Overall, the 
SA-office is a broad monitor of issues, but does not delve deep into any particular subject. That 
in depth analysis is left to the specialist organizations. 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
National Emergency Supply Agency 
The National Emergency Supply Agency (NESA) tasks include providing support for National 
Emergency Supply Organisation (NESO) individual sector and pool organisations in security 
of supply activities. The sectors steer, co-ordinate and monitor preparedness in their respective 
fields and pools are responsible for monitoring, analysing, planning and preparing measures for 
the development of security of supply within their respective industries. NESA acts as the cen-
tral planning and directing agency within the whole field of preparedness in Finland. (NESA, 
2018.) 
 
NESA’s role within national cyber security is twofold: (1) supporting the cyber security pre-
paredness of governmental sector and (2) supporting the cyber security preparedness of private 
sector. The functions supporting the private sector differ in two ways, the regulated industries 
are directed mainly through the regulatory means, while the non-regulated industries are di-
rected through softer means, i.e. facilitating co-operation and providing voluntary support. As 
the NESA functions mainly as a fund, providing monetary support to security of supply and 
preparedness functions, it’s role in the cyber security field is similar: providing support to dif-
ferent initiatives, facilitating co-operation and monitoring preparedness level. 
   
Energy Infrastructure Provider 
For an energy infrastructure provider, the physical view of cyber security is the strongest: func-
tioning of the infrastructure is their main goal. Over the last few years, the logical layer has 
risen in importance and long history of workplace safety operations has enabled the organisa-
tion to leverage their awareness work for cyber security as well. The infrastructure provider 
seems to have a strong history in criticality and preparedness operations, reaching back maybe 
even a hundred years. This legacy is still visible today in the networks and preparedness work 
that is done. 
 
The drivers for the infrastructure industry are largely regulatory, as the functions of the energy 
infrastructure are critical to the functions of society. This is evident in the structure of the whole 
industry, where the organizations are mostly involved in local monopolies, left to function as 
the sole provider for a certain geographic area. This fact combined with heavy preparedness 
and criticality regulation means that cyber security and other security functions are central to 
daily operations for the infrastructure provider. For them, the role is a mandatory player within 
the national cyber security context. 
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In terms of national cyber security, the field of energy infrastructure is highly networked and 
has many working networks around preparedness and cyber security. There is even strong co-
operation internationally, with neighbours to all directions: Sweden, Estonia, Russia etc. The 
enabler for this strong co-operation is the fact that there is very limited competition between 
these operators. The international relations are important enough to side-step effects of interna-
tional crisis, the operative work continues even, when diplomatic relations are frozen between 
countries.  
 
Telecommunications Provider 
Telecommunications is key for the interconnected society running on computing power, so for 
a telecom provider, cyber security is very important. The main aspect driving cyber for a tele-
com is the production of services, even though the regulatory burden is also large. The telecom 
operator needs to look at its production environment beyond the national borders, as its func-
tions for cyber security encompass the Nordics as well. For our telecom the challenge of infor-
mation exchange is not limited to external networks, but internal organization as well: how do 
the different country organizations interact. The cyber organization is a virtual one, encompass-
ing experts from all geographies and supporting local businesses.  
 
For the telecom provider the value of cyber security comes mostly through enabling the conti-
nuity and resilience of its production systems, while they are closely regulated by NCSC-FI, 
the main value realised by the organizations comes through their own business. Customer trust 
and functioning services are primary drivers for the organizations cyber security actions. This 
view makes the information exchange tricky, as it contains potentially critical business infor-
mation. However, this is resolved by how the telecom network operates within the national 
cyber security context, most information is passed to other telecom operators via the NCSC-FI. 
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The telecom operators carry a large burden in national cyber security, as central cogs in the 
cyber network, they have the ability to direct web traffic and even suppress certain connections. 
They rely on fast actions and require it to be supported by up-to-date SA. The telecommunica-
tions industry in Finland works in very close co-operation with the NCSC-FI, as the FICORA 
is the regulatory authority for the industry. The telecom industry has close co-operation in cyber 
issues as well, although mindful of the competition, there is openness when it comes to disclos-
ing large issues that may have wide effects. The NCSC-FI is the central node in the information 
exchange, the operators trust that it will not disclose critical business information to the other 
operators, while also maintaining usable information of the cyber issues and possible mitiga-
tions.  
 
Banking Organization 
A banking organization that in the modern world offers its services to customers via digitized 
channels is very reliant on cyber security to ensure continuity and resilience of its services. The 
continuity of business functions is a major driver of security overall within the organization, 
the benefits of effective cyber security operations has been realised from a business perspective.   
 
The main connections to national cyber security, however, are regulatory. When looking at a 
large enough banking organization, it will be declared critical to functioning of the society and 
as such will be under the mandate if the NESA. In addition to NESA regulations, the banking 
industry is highly regulated for cyber security issues as well. The main parties are the European 
Central Bank, which handles the regulatory supervision of banks deemed large enough on a 
European scale. and the local financial regulator. Both provide ample amounts of regulation 
and auditing of an organizations cyber security, in addition to business, risk management and 
other internal functions. Upon all this, the banking organizations is liable for guidance regulat-
ing certain services, for example credit card industry has its own cyber security provisions.  
 
4.2.2 Cyber Security and National Cyber Security 
 
In this chapter we reflect on the interviews based on our guiding principles. The interview ma-
terial is analysed through the prism of the theoretical background with the aim of understanding 
how the theoretical concepts found relate to the situation on the ground.  
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Cyber Security 
“Cyber Security is just one topic we focus on, but at the same time you need to keep in 
mind that in the modern society everything ties to everything else. 
(VNK SA-office interview.) 
 
All the interviewed parties approach towards cyber security are quite similar, all the layers of 
the Libicki (2007) and US Army (2010) models are represented, although usually not packaged 
quite as neatly. The physical and logical layers are quite a lot more established, than that of the 
social which is mostly reduced to the security awareness of the personnel. Depending on the 
industry of the organization, the emphasis on each layer differs. The infrastructure organization 
puts a big emphasis on the physical side of things, whereas the more software based organiza-
tions, i.e. the banking organization and NCSC-FI, emphasize the logical layer. The social layer 
seems to be the least in focus, as especially the infrastructure focused organization seems to 
hold it in quite a small regard. During the interviews, one gets a feeling that the awareness level 
and the culture of the organization mostly affects the focus based on the social level (i.e. the 
actions of people). In comparison, an organization with a higher level of maturity in security 
awareness, for example the NCSC-FI or the banking organization (where phishing for example 
has been a long-time issue), the social aspects of cyber security are more pronounced. Although, 
in the case of the infrastructure provider the interviewed person was not directly responsible for 
security awareness, and this might explain the focus more on physical and logical layers of 
cyber security.  
 
Cyber security as a concept is understood in similar terms, even though the approach is a little 
different whether you look at it more from a logical layer (as an expansion of traditional infor-
mation security), physical layer (as expansion of traditional (physical) security management). 
Within the interviewed organizations there isn’t any organizations whose outlook is founded 
on the social layer, which of the aspects seems to be the least emphasized. This maybe the least 
understood part of cyber security, especially when dealing with internet personas, information 
operations and manipulation, concepts that have risen to the public consciousness over the last 
few years. However, overall the cyber security framework is very similar between all the actors, 
which should provide a solid footing for national cyber security networks and processes. 
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National Cyber Security 
“The benefits from national cyber security networks and information exchange are diffi-
cult to show, especially in the language business uses: euros. The benefits, especially in 
the long run, reliability and trust are definitely among them.” 
(NESA interview.) 
 
Quite obviously, the governmental organizations and private organizations base their national 
cyber security co-operation on different drivers. The governmental organizations functions are 
based on legislative mandate, which covers their legislative basis, responsibilities and even pre-
scribes resources. The mandates and responsibilities are derived mainly from the national se-
curity and cyber security related documents analysed in chapter 3.1.2. The private organiza-
tions, however, look at cyber security from two very distinct points of view: (1) supporting and 
ensuring resilience for their business functions and (2) regulations based on them from different 
regulative authorities. In the case of the banking organizations the continuity of their business 
functions and problem-free services to their clients are probably the biggest driver of cyber 
security, however on the other hand they need to consider regulations from banking authorities 
(both domestic and European), payment service regulators and National Emergency Supply 
Authority.  
 
For the private organizations the size and industry makes a big difference how they are inte-
grated into the national cyber security network: if the industry is a part of the functions vital to 
society makes an organization a concrete part of the national cyber security network, similarly 
the organizational size, if big enough to be critical, makes it a vital actor within the national 
context. Governmental entities base their functions relating to cyber security on their mandates, 
mostly form legislation. NESA derives its mandate form the Cyber Security Strategy and 
NCSC-FI from the relevant legislation relating to the Communications Regulatory Authority. 
The private organisations relationship to national cyber security is based on the operations and 
regulations relating to said organizations. The telecom industry works very closely with the 
NCSC-FI, who as both the regulatory authority and cyber security authority investigates issues 
and mandates actions based on the results. This is central to information exchange, but requires 
trust, as all the telecom operators need to be able to trust in NCSC-FI to not divulge business 
critical information. The interviewed telecom operator describes the process: “Major threats 
are not hidden, but we openly inform FICORA and NCSC-FI, who process and deliver the 
information to all the operators, if it has implications for them. It helps information exchange, 
to know that NCSC-FI sanitizes the information on the way.” 
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The interaction between private organisations depends greatly on the field of the business and 
the customer – service provider relationship. That is, organizations that provide one another 
services, tend to interact a great deal more, than organizations that have no business functions 
between them. Companies within the same industries co-operate somewhat, especially if they 
belong to highly regulated industries, such as financial or infrastructure provider (physical or 
telecommunications). The client-customer relationship establishes strong interaction and infor-
mation exchange between the parties. In the case of the banking organization “…to the individ-
ual customer a lot of training and guidance is provided, but for the corporate customer, espe-
cially in the insurance business, almost a hands-on role has developed, where risk assessments 
and binding guidelines are part and parcel of everyday business.”  
 
However, much of the networks that function within the national cyber security context are 
based on governmental actor’s initiative, either regulation based co-operation or government 
incentivised groups. Regulated industries are forced to exchange information and complete cer-
tain cyber security related tasks, such as audits (for example The European Central Bank has 
audited at least some of the financial sector organizations in Finland recently). Best example is 
the telecom industry, which is networked strictly around FICORA and NCSC-FI, and their 
mandate to regulate the industry actors. According to the interview with the telecom provider, 
it is quite clear that information exchange on the level that is done through the NCSC-FI, would 
not happen directly between the competing operators: “… you must always evaluate rigorously 
what information to share, especially the business related.” Information that has gone through 
the NCSC-FI analysis is a smaller risk of giving up anything business related. 
 
Looking at the links to national cyber security networks, a big difference-maker is the history 
that the industry has of preparedness operations. A distinct difference can be noted between the 
banking organisation and the energy infrastructure provider, main reason seems to be the his-
tory of working within a regulatory context. The infrastructure industry has been wrestling with 
these continuity issues for over a hundred years, whereas the banking organisation has been 
dealing with ICT and cyber security issues for little over 20 years. How established the links 
are makes a big difference in the level of trust and information exchange. The infrastructure 
provider explains: “… culture of preparedness comes from history, long history of preparing 
for power grid problems, snowy winters etc. We have been preparing for a hundred years.” 
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A lack of competition seems to be a major enabler for trust and communications within the 
national cyber security networks. Organizations that have nothing to lose by giving out infor-
mation have a very low threshold for doing so. The difference to a competitive industry is pro-
nounced: banking organisations have a lower level of interaction, even if one wouldn’t consider 
cyber security a big area of competition between the different actors in the industry. The bank-
ing organization articulates the challenge form their point of view: “The challenge is how to 
exchange information between competitors without divulging business critical information? 
And on the other hand, how much of the information can be sanitized for it to still be useful?”  
 
The private organizations show a presence of personal connections of their cyber security per-
sonnel, who in the courses of their career have built confidential relationships or even set up 
confidential networks between same industry peers. These networks are interpersonal and func-
tion on a strict confidentiality and anonymity basis: whatever is disclosed will not be made 
public. The penalty would most likely be loss of these valuable connections and reputation. 
These connections are not a major part of cyber security organization or operations, but provide 
a network of confidential connections, where even confidential vulnerability information can 
be exchanged. These personal connections seem to function in industries with high competition 
between actors, as such seem to compensate for the lack of formal networks. They may be a 
function of filling up vacuums, where there isn’t any formalized framework for co-operation.  
 
4.2.3 Situation Understanding 
“…a malware by itself may not be very interesting, but understanding how it has pene-
trated the system is very interesting.” 
(NCSC-FI interview) 
 
How does Situation Understanding emerge in the interviewed organizations and how are they 
able to exchange information on a national level? These questions are looked at in this chapter 
focusing on the guiding principle of SU. 
 
Situation Awareness 
“If there is no situation awareness, NCSC-FI is useless.” 
(NCSC-FI interview) 
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Practically all the interviewed organization had some type of SA-implementation in place, 
whether a SA-system that collects and displays the information directly or a process that col-
lects information throughout the organization and provides a SA-picture to the personnel and 
leadership. These SA-processes align with the Endsley (e.g. 1995) SA-model, with three 
phases, while the OODA-loop (e.g. Boyd, 1987) Orient-phase points distinctly to the SU-pro-
cesses of the studied organizations. The operative SA and analytical SU processes are more 
separated according to the interviews for the studied organizations than our theoretical model 
would presume. This may be caused by the separation of operative cyber security and more 
strategic cyber security functions within these organizations, especially the private ones.  
 
The SA-models of the studied organizations are based mainly on technical solutions and their 
monitoring, there is a definite bias towards internal and technical information, and most imple-
mentations are rather technology based dashboard-type solutions. Outside SA-information, e.g. 
threat feeds and actor information, seems to be very qualitative, i.e. it is added to the SA-picture 
during analysis. The SA-implementation is connected to internal processes, that monitor the 
SA-indicators and launch internal processes as required. This also shows, that for the SA-pro-
cesses the internal view is of more importance, than the outside sources of threats and vulnera-
bilities. This may be an issue of the incident management processes, that mainly deal with look-
ing at the internal infrastructure and problems within it. Only later in the processes do external 
considerations come into consideration, if the internal actions are no effective to solve the issues 
or finally after the issues have been resolved with study of root causes and lessons-learned-
processes.  
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Most SA-processes for the interviewed parties are concerned with the perception and compre-
hension phases, the main tasks are collection and analysis of information to determine the cur-
rent status of cyber security. There is very little formalized SU-action within the SA-processes. 
However, the SU-functions are mainly built within certain reporting and planning processes. 
For example, the NCSC-FI offers SU information: “…currently our SA is tasked with the col-
lection of passive SA-picture and the projection is accomplished through annual or semi-annual 
reports to our stakeholders.” Similarly, the private organizations interviewed take the SA-in-
formation, process it through reporting and provide SU-information via expert analysis and 
planning of development actions. This seems to be a distinct characteristic of the private organ-
izations, where the SA-process seems to consist two separate cycles: (1) SA-process runs as an 
operative cyber security process that provides information for operative actions, and (2) SU-
process where the data from SA-process is combined with different intelligence feeds and fed 
into the reporting and planning processes of the organizations, through which it is refined into 
development actions (The SU-process for these organizations).  
 
Two of the governmental actors’ whole purpose is almost based on providing Situation Aware-
ness: NCSC-FI and the Governmental Situation Awareness Office. These two functions are 
focused on very different views on SA: (1) NCSC-FI focuses solely on network related SA, (2) 
the SA-office looks at SA more on government functions point of view, the political situation 
around the world and special incidents, additionally the SA-office is also focused on analysis 
and provides SU to governmental actors, rather than pure SA-picture. These actors mission 
brief mandates them to be very SA-oriented, which clearly shows in the interviews.  
 
 
Situation Understanding 
“…Situation Understanding links closely with operative actions and goals in preserving 
smooth and reliable business functions, looking at more at the longer term.” 
(Banking organization interview.) 
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As noted in the Situation Awareness above: the SU is not really a part of SA-process for the 
interviewed actors, especially the private organizations. Situation Understanding emerges 
within these organizations either through reporting and planning processes or organically 
through the cyber security experts analysing and interacting within the organizations. The in-
frastructure organization explains: “First we get a notification of a threat scenario through our 
networks. The information is passed on to our security experts, who analyse it internally. Then 
through internal reporting and analysis, it finally leads to the desks of our c-level who take in 
the conclusions and decide on the recommended actions.” This is a common route of an inci-
dent or threat information flowing through the interviewed organizations, finally being digested 
into conclusions, recommendations and development actions. The bureaucracy takes hold.  
 
During the process of turning SA into SU, the organizations collect a lot of data to complement 
their SA-picture: governmental information, different threat intelligence sources, OSINT and 
networks (official and unofficial, even personal) are leveraged to better provide understanding 
of what the SA means and how the situation may develop in the future. The infrastructure pro-
vider elaborated their information collection to include: “…we look at the attackers and their 
motivations. This gives us priceless insight into the severity of the threat, whether we can handle 
it ourselves or if we need to contact outside actors, for example the governmental ones.” Lots 
of different resources are leveraged, mainly as qualitative additions to largely quantitative data 
of the SA-picture.  
 
For the private organizations, moving from SA and SC-operations towards SU brings business 
understanding and functions into the conversation. Looking at the longer term cyber security 
goals, one needs to consider the goals and requirements of the business, rather than looking 
only at the security or It-operations. The responsibility for cyber security: “…it’s separated 
threefold: (1) operative information security that handles the SA-process and related actions, 
(2) cyber security development that handles policy and development plans and (3) cyber archi-
tecture that handles the development of secure architecture and architecting the security solu-
tions”, a structure that emphasizes the different views of cyber security, the needs of operative 
information security as well as the needs of the business functions. This requires the cyber 
security organisation to provide insight into the cyber security situation and incidents, so that 
these issues can be evaluated within the business scope and conclusions can be drawn.  
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The SA process in turning SA into SU for many of the organizations is about proactively man-
aging future threats and risks. This fits well into the theoretical view of SU as the projection of 
future status, even though most organizations do not regard this as a part of the SA-process. 
Rather, it is seen more as a part of the internal reporting and planning processes. Most of the 
interviewed organizations look at the SA-process as purely operative cyber security, in this 
view the SU-phase of the process is a different one and may even be the responsibility of an-
other organization altogether, as our example of the banking organization above, where the SA-
process is divided to the turfs of three different internal organizations. Interestingly the long-
term view brings the external considerations more into the evaluation: the threats, risks and 
adversaries feature more heavily in the SU-process than they do in the SA-process. This may 
be the result of the division of SA- and SU-processes to the different levels of organization and 
the separation of the operative and strategic.  
 
Looking at SU through the lens of OODA-loops Orient-phase (Boyd, 1995), some conclusions 
can be drawn of the importance of cultural tradition and previous experience to the emergence 
of SU-process: 
- Within the infrastructure industry has a long history of preparedness and continuity 
planning, that provides strong frameworks not only to the networks within the indus-
try, but also for the SU-process of the firms. As these frameworks give structure and 
previous experience makes understanding cause and effect easier, the SU-framework 
for these actors is very mature. Under these conditions, combining new threats (cyber) 
into the framework is easier and as such the SU-process to provide insight into these 
threats is also easier. 
- Compared to less mature industries (e.g. banking that has been dealing with cyber 
threats for only 20 years, or the NCSC-FI that has been around for less than 10 years), 
there are less ready frameworks to build SU on. Even as these actors are able to create 
a functionable SA-picture, the SU-functions are less established and function more on 
an ad hoc basis, combining with normal reporting and planning structures within the 
organizations.  
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This existence of established ways of working, networks and tradition in preparing for emer-
gency situations is a huge benefit in emergence of SU. For example, the infrastructure industry 
manages quite a lot of scenario based planning and exercises, where the scenarios are based on 
very high impact incidents. This provides deep understanding of what can happen and how one 
responds to these worst-case scenarios. During normal operations one rarely meets these kinds 
of incidents, where everything seems to go wrong. So, planning and preparing for them makes 
it easier to respond to so called normal incidents, that at least hopefully are not as severe as the 
worst outcomes planned and trained for.  
 
Shared Situation Understanding 
“…all actors feel like they are the only ones with their specific problems. We try to facil-
itate information exchange to break this misunderstanding, as most issues are not unique, 
but affect plenty of organizations.” 
(NCSC-FI interview.) 
 
The issue of a lack of functionable networks makes production of a shared situation understand-
ing very difficult within the national context. As the networks function is very much based on 
central nodes that tend to be governmental actors, the only real national SU-view is within these 
actors. The effectiveness of these networks a hampered by two factors: (1) information ex-
change is muchly one-way, there is very little or no feedback to enrich the usually very technical 
information collected and sent (i.e. technical SA information collected by a private organization 
and sent to NCSC-FI, or threat information sent by NCSC-FI to different actors) and (2) the 
central nodes are key in information exchange, there has not emerged information exchange 
between the different actors connected to this central node (i.e. private organizations in a net-
work haven’t started to exchange information between themselves, without the governmental 
actor facilitating the exchange).  
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Even if the overall networks are not functioning as well as one would hope, there are certain 
industry networks that provide robust information exchange and even SU-functionalities. 
Within the interviewed organizations, at least energy infrastructure and telecommunications 
industries function as a network when it comes to cyber incidents. There are different drivers 
for these two industries: (1) the energy infrastructure industry is not in direct competition be-
tween the different parties, the industry consists of local monopolies, so information sharing is 
not a risk to the businesses, (2) the telecommunications industry is extremely critical to the 
functions of society and as such is very closely monitored and regulated, this regulation pro-
vides a central node to the industry as the NCSC-FI is a trusted central information sharing 
node. Compared for example to the banking industry, there doesn’t seem to be a similar level 
of trust within the industry, even though it is quite heavily regulated. The issue may be, that 
there is a very high level of competition and a lot of organizations that are international, this 
may make building trust difficult. One issue may also be the fact that the largest financial or-
ganizations in Finland are overseen by the European Central Bank, instead of a local authority. 
 
A lack of common goals is a big issue in creating shared SU within the context of national cyber 
security. Although many high-level goals are articulated in the governmental documents, there 
are very few common goals between the actors. The interviews provided no such goals, that 
would act as Boyd’s (1987) schwerpunkt – the shared, common objective of actions that would 
direct the actors – but rather the goals were very individualized: the governmental actors viewed 
the cyber world through their own mandate and legislation, whereas the private actors were 
driven by their business goals and regulatory requirements. 
 
Shared SU is made harder by a lack of common framework for information and data sharing: 
there are no guidelines for what type and in what form information should be shared. The 
NCSC-FI has some technical data gathering solutions, which automate the data collections and 
provide some analysis by the NCSC-FI, but other than that there are no formalized frameworks. 
If this information collection is unstructured, there is a risk of data overload, as organizations 
may be tempted to overshare, especially if regulated to do so. This issue with regulation came 
up in all the private organization interviews, where the actors suffer under tremendous amounts 
of regulation from different parties. The banking organization, for example, is regulated by the 
Financial Supervisory Authority, The European Central Bank and NESA as the main regulators, 
in addition to this they have certain service related regulation (e.g. PCI-DSS), and guidelines 
from the NCSC-FI and different laws, such as GDPR. These regulations are often contradictory, 
with no central authority to consult on them. Co-ordination between the authorities is required. 
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One major missing point of view, that makes shared SU that much harder to achieve, is the lack 
of focus on business operations and needs within the governmental actors. Based on the inter-
views, one gets the feeling that the governmental actors view cyber security almost as separate 
from the everyday business of the private actors. In the NESA interview, there was a realisation 
of the problems of attracting private actors out of the scope of regulation to the national net-
works, but this was the only interview where this dichotomy was articulated. And even then, 
the solutions were few in forthcoming: how to incentivise the private actors into attending the 
national cyber security networks if they did not have a regulatory or legislative must? 
 
Situation Understanding in Cyber Context 
“…you always have to keep in mind, that cyber is only one aspect of the whole. We live 
in an age where everything affects everything else, and cyber is just one of those things.” 
(VNK SA-office interview.) 
 
The main view of SU in cyber context in the interviews is the reminder, that cyber is just one 
of the issues affecting these actors. A stark reminder that cyber security is not the sole issue that 
these organizations are dealing with, the only exception being the NCSC-FI. However, all in 
all, even as cyber security has gained in importance over the last 10 years, it is still a support 
function to other organizational operations, be it business or governmental. The organizations 
always function as wholes and look to fulfil the main goals, which for the private organizations 
are based on business needs. So, understanding the cyber security situation needs to be framed 
in the larger context of organizational goals and requirements. 
 
From the interviews, one is tempted to conclude that the external view prevails: it seems to be 
easier to deal with understanding threats and threat actors, rather than the nitty-gritty of internal 
ICT-solutions and -operations. This aligns somewhat with Kugler (in Kramer, Starr & Wentz, 
2009, 333), who emphasizes the understanding of adversary goals, capabilities and tools. Even 
if this external view is important, what may be even more important for true SU is the 
knowledge of an organizations internal functions and technological solutions that support them. 
This is the message that Tadda & Salerno (in Jajodia et al., 2010, 28.) emphasize, but from the 
interviews it seems that this aspect is not centralized within the organizations, but rather infor-
mation is distributed among the experts in charge of these functionalities. When knowledge of 
these functions or solutions is required, rather than having documentation or understanding of 
them, an expert is consulted. 
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Similarly, this same dichotomy of external-vs-internal seems to hold for national level cyber 
SU as well: the threat environment is followed in almost real-time with different sources and 
even automatic feeds, threat actors, vulnerabilities etc. are communicated and acted upon. How-
ever, the understanding of cyber infrastructure is mainly built either through annual or semi-
annual regulatory reporting or built ad hoc relating to an incident or crisis situation. The diffi-
culty in having a strong internal view of infrastructure to base SU on is the complexities in-
volved. Internal situations and infrastructures can range wildly from one another and every 
organization is different. 
 
For shared SU in a cyber context one would have to sanitize the specifics that might reveal 
business critical issues or other major vulnerabilities. The level of shared SU information would 
have to be carefully assessed and sharing guidelines, especially for the governmental actors, 
would have to be mutually agreed. This is critical to foster trust into the network and its infor-
mation exchange practices, so that organizations can be sure that no critical information will be 
shared unnecessarily. A framework, guidelines and implicit trust are some of the basic qualities 
that a shared SU network requires to be able to function. These issues have been raised by all 
the private organizations and even mentioned by the governmental ones, even though for them 
business critical information is not as big an issue as for the private firms.  
 
5 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
This chapter presents the conclusions based on the guiding principles and empirical study anal-
ysis. The research questions are answered in the next chapter and discussion on the study results 
is presented below as well. Finally, study reliability and validity is discussed.  
 
5.1 Conclusions 
 
Research question: What does situation understanding comprise within the context of national 
cyber security? 
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Cyber security as understood by the studied organizations closely resembles the Libicki (2007) 
and US Army (2010) three-layered model. Emphasis is on the physical and logical layers; the 
social layer being reduced to personnel security awareness and not the wider encompassing 
concept of cyber personas and information warfare. All the studied organizations look at the 
cyber security field very similarly as the guiding principle cyber security is defined in this study, 
especially as Andress and Winterfield (2014, 30-32) define cyber defence as a collection of 
information assurance, computer network defence, incident response and critical infrastructure 
protection, with the aim of preventing, detecting and responding to outside actor’s attempts to 
deny or manipulate information and/or infrastructure. This is frame of cyber security for all the 
studied parties: a mix of governance and policy, awareness and technical protections. 
 
National cyber security is defined by the governmental documents analysed in chapter 3.1.2. 
and is mostly built on the functions vital for society. In modern world, these functions rely on 
functioning ICT-infrastructure, which brings the studied private organizations into the frame-
work. National cyber security is built on the functions of certain governmental actors and upon 
the private organizations deemed critical to the functioning of the infrastructure. These include 
the three industries which were chosen for this study: energy infrastructure, telecommunica-
tions and banking. The national cyber security on one hand is the co-operation and co-ordina-
tion of these organizations that are deemed critical and on the other hand the cyber security of 
each of these organizations.  
 
Research question: How does situation understanding arise from situation awareness? 
 
Situation Awareness is a key function of overall cyber security for the studied organizations, 
all are working on SA-systems or -processes to provide insight into their cyber security situa-
tion. All the solutions map well against the Endsley (e.g. 1995) SA-process, with the observa-
tion- and comprehension-phases present for all actors. The biggest difference comes looking at 
the comprehension phase, where differences emerge and it is more of a co-operative function 
in the organizations. The fact is all of these organizations rely on their SA-capabilities to keep 
them up to date regarding their cyber security. The SA-processes function within the cyber 
security scope defined in the paragraph above and for all studied organizations this structure 
seems to be similar. 
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Situation Understanding and its emergence in these organization diverges between the govern-
mental actors and private organizations: (1) for the governmental organizations SU is a key part 
of their SA-process, where their SA-process continues beyond the comprehension phase and 
into projecting the future status and making conclusions based on this projection, (2) for the 
private actors the SA-process is the responsibility of the cyber security organizations, but the 
SU emerges through reporting and planning-processes, where the SA-information becomes one 
part of background information for business and development planning. This may be the reason 
why the drivers for national cyber security differ so much between governmental and private 
organizations: business point of view becomes a heavy part of the discussion, even in cyber 
security SU.  
 
Research question: How does situation understanding form in a network of national cyber 
security actors, through shared situation awareness and understanding? 
 
For shared SU the conclusions are difficult to make: there doesn’t seem to be a framework for 
this level of information within the national cyber security context. The SU-processes seem to 
diverge between the governmental and private organizations, and after this divergence there are 
a lot of inhibiting factors to the information exchange. For the private organizations the SU 
information potentially includes a lot of business insight, which makes sharing very sensitive. 
This highlights the quality of SU as very context bound and hard to transfer. The national level 
shared-SU seems to be enabled rather by shared-SA, rather than sharing SU-information. This 
shared-SA can be facilitated by the governmental actors, as we have seen through the inter-
views. The telecom example highlights how a trusted intermediary, in this case a governmental 
agency, funnelling and sanitizing shared information to competitors, can facilitate information 
exchange. More effort should be afforded by the governmental organizations into building a 
common information sharing framework, with focus on security and privacy of the information, 
business benefits for the participants and defined ways of working.  
 
The national cyber security context deals mainly in shared-SA and is quite effective in those 
areas that are under direct governmental cyber security mandate: in this study the telecommu-
nications industry working in close co-operation with the NCSC-FI and the infrastructure in-
dustry has close co-operation within its own field. The banking industry co-ordinates with the 
regulatory authorities and has co-operation with the NCSC-FI, but the industry cyber security 
functions are less formalized than the two other industries that were studied. Some of these 
effects are evaluated in the Discussion-chapter below.  
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These findings align with the theoretical views on the prerequisites for shared-SA or -SU, for 
example the factors highlighted by Sweazy and Salas (1992): common goals, interdependency 
and specialized roles and duties seem to be mostly lacking in the National Cyber context. Ends-
ley & Jones (1997) of defined roles within a group can be seen at least somewhat in the infra-
structure and telecommunications industries, where the government has used its heavy hand to 
regulate and mandate preparedness networks. These issues point towards the lacking structure 
for both network building and organizational roles within those networks, as well as a lack of 
framework for information sharing. 
 
To conclude a reminder from one of the interviews, why cyber security needs to be a priority 
initiative for the national security: 
 “Cyberwar is cheap, easy and you cannot be caught” 
 
5.2 Discussion 
 
Based upon a small sample of national cyber security actors drawing concrete conclusions is 
difficult. The conclusions that arise from abductive research and the interviews are inherently 
true, but making generalisations based on this thesis only is something that must be done ap-
prehensively. The results from this study point to some factors and influences regarding emer-
gence of shared situation understanding, but to make generalisations would require further 
study and validation.  
 
The frame of reference between the organizations is consistent, the studied organizations have 
similar understanding of the studied concepts. Cyber security and national cyber security con-
cepts were similar between all the interviewed actors, in addition all were operating some kind 
of Situation Awareness system or process. Situation Understanding was understood little dif-
ferently at the different organizations, this difference and its meaning to this study is elaborated 
in the next paragraph. Overall, the similarity is a factor that will provide reliability for the re-
sults, as we can trust that organizations studied understand the framework of cyber security and 
national cyber security and view Situation Awareness in a comparable way.  
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When evaluating the results regarding SA and SU, there is a distinct divergence between them: 
(1) SA is a concept understood, accepted and practice by all the studied organizations in a very 
similar way, (2) SU, however, while a concept that is understood and practiced, is not as uni-
form as the SA functions and emerges very differently between the organizations. The biggest 
difference seems to be between the governmental and private organizations, due maybe to the 
required view through business goals and requirements. It may be beneficial for the govern-
mental actors to build a better understanding of the business context of each industry and even 
each organization. This may be difficult to achieve, especially on an organizational level, but 
would benefit the national cyber security. One thing is clear: the government must look at co-
operation more through the lens of business benefits for the private organizations, rather than 
through the scope of regulation. Lemieux (2015, 144-147) highlights three major incentives for 
a company to join cyber security information sharing networks: (1) social approval for co-op-
erative behaviour, (2) reduced costs through increased cyber resilience and (3) access to high-
quality information to serve decision-making and operational capabilities. Out of these, number 
1 would be fairly easy to produce within the national context, however 2 and 3 require frame-
work for information sharing and high-quality analytical capabilities. These are, however, 
clearly manageable by the governmental organizations and may be the kind of initiatives that 
will provide enhanced national cyber security.  
 
There are best practices in place around the world, that could be leveraged in Finland. Moulton, 
Stavridis and Uthoff (in Lemieux, 2015, 122-125) outline a public-private partnership-based 
“Federal Cyber Board”, that would promote not only cyber security, but the cyber space and 
related issues as well. Included within the charter for the FCB would be the understanding and 
fostering of business opportunities within the cyber space as well, this would combine strong 
business initiatives with the burden of enforcing strong cyber security together. A balance 
struck between mandatory burdens and business benefits would act as a strong enhancer of trust 
and co-operation. A similar approach might be beneficial for Finland (or even EU) as well.  
 
The interviews point to some factors that inhibit and benefit information sharing within the 
national cyber security networks. Factors that seem to benefit information sharing for shared 
SU: 
- Lack of competition 
- Trust in confidentiality of information shared 
- Confidential governmental authority acting as central node in sharing network 
- Confidential personal relationship between experts 
- History of preparedness co-operation within industry 
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Factors that seem to inhibit information sharing for shared SU 
- Strong competition between organizations 
- International operations 
- Lack of regulation and central regulatory authority 
- Lack of framework and guidelines for information sharing (what to share and how) 
 
The first factor of inhibiting information exchange, i.e. competition between organizations, 
seems to point towards the need for stronger governmental requirement to act as a facilitator in 
the information exchange. The telecommunications industry example backs up this conclusion, 
as a central node providing trust, privacy and security to the information exchange has enabled 
a functioning network for cyber security within the industry. 
 
You could also look at the results through dichotomies; where two distinctly opposite choices 
both bring their own advantages and disadvantages. One might even understand them through 
Clausewitz’s concept of friction (von Clausewitz, 1997, 66-69.), where it is said that: “Activity 
in war is a movement in resistant medium.” It certainly seems to hold true in cyber security as 
well, where dichotomies of separate choices bring their own frictions and advantages-disad-
vantages for both ends of the spectrum:  
 
Private - public 
A private company strives to produce wealth to its owners. All actions are subsidiary to this 
aim and if a large enough crisis falls upon a private company, it always has the option of liqui-
dating its assets and calling it quits. The public actors have no such option, but rather must keep 
up the fight until the bitter end. This dichotomy brings distinctly different drivers and possibil-
ities in directing and running cyber security.  
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Regulated – Unregulated 
A dichotomy which concerns mostly the private companies, where the ones that are under gov-
ernment regulation through either business functions (e.g. banking) or have been deemed criti-
cal for the functions of society and as such are under preparedness regulation (e.g. infrastructure 
or telecom provider) can be brought under the national cyber security umbrella by government 
decree. Compare that to businesses that are under no such obligations, free to base their cyber 
security functions to serve their business functions and those alone. If cyber security is a func-
tion that is as strong as its weakest link, then these unregulated actors need to ensure their cyber 
security at least to a functionable level. How does the government ensure this? There needs to 
be some combination of the carrot and stick: benefits need to be realized in taking part to na-
tional cyber security actions. 
 
Centralized – Distributed 
One must consider the system to lead the cyber security on a national level: do you push for a 
centralized bureaucracy or try to build a distributed system, where smaller networks (based 
around industries for example) are the central unit? For this dichotomy the governments answer 
seems to lie somewhere in the middle, where governmental and regulated organizations are run 
through a somewhat centralized system, but for the others a distributed system is in place. The 
NESA interview highlights the need for cluster intelligence, akin to a school of fish responding 
to a predator. This dichotomy has been understood within the governmental actors and a lot of 
though is going to the building of networks, fostering trust and facilitating information sharing. 
 
National – International 
As modern world becomes more interconnected the national borders mean less each passing 
day, especially in cyber space. One is drawn towards the conclusion that national level net-
working, however important, is not enough in the modern world. This seems to be true not only 
to companies, but governmental actors as well. Cyber-crime is distinctly cross-border activity, 
information warfare pays little heed to borders and even regulation is becoming increasingly 
regional, instead of national. An important dichotomy to keep in mind, although mostly out of 
the scope of this thesis. 
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5.3 Reliability and validity 
 
The scope of the empirical research is limited, so making of sweeping conclusions is risky. Are 
you able to draw far reaching conclusions from a group of six organizations within a field that 
includes thousands of actors? One must be careful in generalizing findings from such a scope, 
but within abductive research method the assumption of validity for the interview material still 
holds (Grönfors, 2011, 20). However, we must ask how valid are the conclusions made based 
on the source materials are? And here we should be careful, as the interviews were conducted 
with a limited amount of organizations.  
 
The issues with the interviewed organizations are real and as such bring valuable insight into 
the cyber security networks on a national level. As we can see similarities between the theoret-
ical models of the guiding principles and the concepts and frameworks arising from the inter-
views, we can conclude at least some validity in the results. The fact that the concepts are un-
derstood similarly, gives the research and conclusions at least some merit. The issue is rather 
in making generalizations and wider rules based on the small sample size. This similarity speaks 
for the reliability of the study as well, even if the information from the interviews will prove to 
be hard to repeat, the framework that we are working in seems to hold.  
 
Overall, the selected study method of abductive research has been shown to be beneficial with 
a research topic such as Situation Understanding. The ability to use induction for a topic such 
as SU, which differs greatly from organization and application to the next, might be limited. 
Abduction, however, gives the study some leeway in interpreting the results based on guiding 
principles. The fact that the findings from the interviews must be logical and understood in the 
context of the guiding principles, give the researcher ability to pose conclusions that seem to be 
true. The generalizations done based on the conclusions of this study must be limited, and ide-
ally should be supported by further study. (Grönfors, 2011, 17-18.) 
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Picking the people for the interviews, compromises had to be made, as especially in the private 
organizations it is very hard to pinpoint persons with a complete, in-depth view to cyber secu-
rity. Excluding the governmental organizations, the interviewed people oversaw cyber security 
in some capacity, but the exact responsibilities differ very much in each organization. This fact 
makes definite conclusions on some issues difficult to make, for example which layer of cyber 
security is emphasized within each organization. If the person interviewed was in charge of 
physical infrastructure, then quite obviously, in his answers this aspect will be highlighted. 
However, overall the interviewees were able in the interview situation look at the issues beyond 
their own duties, but still some bias may remain.  
 
Overall, the insights and conclusions form this study point towards issues and benefits within 
the national cyber security framework. The study also has pointed to some factors benefitting 
and hampering the information exchange and dichotomies in place. To make definite rules or 
firm generalizations, however, more research is required. But this may be the biggest contribu-
tion of this thesis: to highlight issues within the national cyber security to further the under-
standing and provide ideas as seeds for further study. 
 
5.4 Further Research 
 
One major contribution of this thesis is the highlighting of national cyber security and the re-
lated networks of public and private actors as a fairly immature field of study, especially in 
Finland. While making sweeping generalizations and policy initiatives based on this one study 
would be nonsensical, this thesis has produced quite a few points of view for further study: 
- Facilitating co-operation between industry competitors for national cyber security 
- Establishing trust between competitors to disclose and share cyber security related info 
- Looking at the networks of a single actor, especially a private organization: how and 
what kind of networks is the organization involved in (customers, service providers 
etc.) 
- Studying a set network of actors that reside within a single network (i.e. organizations 
that actually co-operate together regarding national cyber security) 
- Studying an industry as a national cyber security network 
- Looking at the international aspect, how do international business operations affect 
taking part in national cyber security? 
- Evaluating the effect of the dichotomies listed above in the Discussion-chapter 
- Building a framework for effective cyber security information sharing network 
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APPENDIX 1: List of governmental actors and their designation in Finnish 
The governmental actors related to national cyber security and mentioned within the thesis. 
Listed is the current organizations title and abbreviation in English and their Finnish title (as of 
04/2018). 
 
FICORA – Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority - Viestintävirasto 
Financial Supervisory Authority - Finanssivalvonta 
Government ICT Centre - Valtori 
Governmental Situation Awareness Office – Valtioneuvoston Tilannekuvatoimisto 
Ministry of Defence - Puolustusministeriö 
NCSC-FI – National Cyber Security Center Finland - Kyberturvallisuuskeskus 
NESA – National Emergency Supply Authority - Huoltovarmuuskeskus 
NESO - National Emergency Supply Organisation - Huoltovarmuusorganisaatio 
The Secretariat of the Security Committee – Turvallisuuskomitean sihteeristö 
The Security Committee - Turvallisuuskomitea 
 
